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BECAUSE CALIFORNIA HAS SOME OF THE MOST INTRICATE AND CONTROVERSIAL LAND USE LAWS IN THE COUNTRY, MY COLLEAGUES AND I WANT TO
SEE HOW FAR THESE CASES REALLY GO.
PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS NEED
PROTECTION FROM REGULATIONS THAT GO TOO FAR. BUT WE ALSO NEED TO
SEE IF LOCAL OFFICIALS CAN STILL USE LAND USE REGULATIONS TO
PROTECT THE PUBLIC'S SAFETY AND WELL-BEING.
LANDOWNERS AND PUBLIC OFFICIALS NEED TO RE-EXAMINE THEIR
RESPONSIBILITIES IN LIGHT OF THESE CASES. AND THE LEGISLATURE
HAS A CLEAR DUTY TO HELP SORT OUT THESE ISSUES. LEGISLATORS NEED
TO UNDERSTAND IF THESE CASES ARE THE END OF A REGULATORY ERA OR
JUST NARROW LEGAL INTERPRETATIONS.
I WANT THIS TO BE A FORUM
WHERE EVERYONE CAN GET THE ANSWERS THEY NEED.
-0-
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- 25 and it cast no doubt on the use of subdivision exactions and
dedication requirements so long as there exists a causal relation
between the problem created and the exaction demanded.
In a series of recent cases involving business regulation,
most of them decided unanimously,
the Court has sustained
legislation that
is very
costly to
property owners, is
retroactive
in
its
application,
invalidates
contractual
arrangements, and plainly disappoints well-established economic
expectations. These uncontroversial cases signal that the Court
has no inclination to challenge the extensive regulatory schemes
in effect in a wide swath of areas such as pension benefits, home
ownership, employee medical coverage, water pollution control,
nuclear industry
liability, social
security and pesticide
regulation.
This is not as surpr1s1ng as it might at first seem. In an
economy like ours, where the assumption, virtually across the
political spectrum, is that government has a role to play in
dealing with issues like unemployment,
interest rates, money
supply, labor-management disputes, toxic wastes, and so on, a
substantial
amount
of
public involvement in shaping and
management of the economy is inescapable. And that means a good
deal of law that changes the rules of the game and affects the
value of property. It is not easy to imagine even the most
property-oriented Court holding regulation of taxies, limiting
compensation for a nuclear accident, or regulating pension
benefits, unconstitutional. So long as government is a major
player in the management of the economy, judicially-imposed
constitutional limits on property regulation are destined to be
marginal matters. No revolution in property is on the horizon.

How then explain the results in Nollan and First Lutheran
Church? The Court saw Nollan as a coerced contr
a
public easement,- government "
which the Court has
condemned.
It did not see the case as a conventional
subdivision dedication of roads
or
parklands,
where the
contribution is meant to remedy a problem the development itself
has created.
First Lutheran Church does s
icant
change the rules
of property/taking law, by imposing the economic burden of
unconstitutional regulation on the government, rather than the
landowner, for the period during which constitutionality is being
litigated.
But
since
not
many
regulations
are
found
unconstitutional, its practical,impact is likely to be slight.
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STATEMENT OF
PROFESSOR JOSEPH L. SAX
BOALT HALL (LAW SCHOOL)
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA (BERKELEY)
before the
California Legislature
Senate Committee
on
Local Government
Special Hearing
THE LIMITS OF LAND USE REGULATION
August 13, 1987

To help understand the significance of the U.S. Supreme
Court's recent decisions in
Nollan v.
California Coastal
Commission! and First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of
Glendale v. County of Los Angeles2, some background on the modern
history of property cases in the Court may be useful to you.
Because I am the first witness today, I shall, before providing
that background,
briefly summarize the Nollan and First Lutheran
Church cases.
A

SL~RY

OF THE TEMPORARY TAKING CASE (First Lutheran Church)

the church owned land in a flood
~~~~~~~~~~~~in. Following a
destroyed the church's buildings,
the Coun
adopted an ordinance prohibiting reconstruction within
a designated flood protection area that included First Lutheran
Church's land. First Lutheran Church claimed that it had been
denied all use of its property, and that the ordinance therefore
constituted a ~aking of its proper . It sought just compensation
measured from the day the ordinance had been adopted. The
question before the U.S.
Supreme Court was not whether such
regulation did or did not constitute a taking. The Court decided
only a constitutional
question. The issue in the case was
whether--assuming that the regulation in question constituted a
taking because it was so restrictive--the church was entitled to
be compensated for the time the ordinance was in effect, or
whether it was sufficient for the County to simply withdraw the
ordinance upon being told by a court that it was invalid.
The Court held (in a 6-3 decision) that if a land use
regulation is found to be invalid as a constitutional "taking" of
property, then "just compensation" must be paid for the period of

55 U.S. Law Week 5145 (June 26, 1987).
2

55 U.S. Law Week 4781 (June 9, 1987).
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- 29 the height of a building.
As the Court put it, " ... unless the permit condition serves
the same governmental
purpose as the development ban, the
building restriction is not a valid
ion of land use but an
out and out plan of extortion."3
The Court then turned to the
factual question which underlay its constitutional law rule: Was
there a nexus of purpose between some problem the Nollan proposal
would create and the remedy the Commission proposed? The Court
emphatically denied the presence of any such nexus.
It said it
could not see any relation between a claimed right to view the
beach that Nollan might block, or a psychological barrier coastal
homeowners might be imposing by making the beach seem closed to
the public, and a public easement across the
beach. The
Commission did not seem to the Court to be dealing with the
problem Nollan was creating; it seemed rather to have seized on
those problems as an excuse to exact something else it wanted all
along, a public pathway along the beach above the high tide line.

NOLLAN AND FIRST LUTHERAN CHURCH IN CONTEXT
Two questions are raised by Nollan and First Lutheran
Church: (l) Are these cases the leading edge of a fundamental
revision,
favorable to landowners, of property rights after
decades of judicial neglect?
(2) Will these cases fundamentally
change the way California local governments, and the Coastal
Commission, will have to do business?
No one can
an unambiguous answer to these questions.
But some informed
can be made about where the Court is
go
, and how local governments and states should respond. Here
are the points to which I would call attention.
Plainly we have a more conservative, proper
iented U.S.
Court than we have had in many decades, and plainly
is on th~ Court 1 s
in a way it' has not been for
more than half a century. From the 1920's until the last halfdozen years, we averaged not more than one "taking" cases every
few years. Since the famous Euc
and Nectow2 cases in 1926 and
1928 the Court had virtually refused to concern itself with local
land use cases. One can literally count on a single hand the
zoning-related case
that had--until very recently--reached the
--~·--------

3

55 U.S. Law Week, at 5148.
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- 31 unanimity in the current Court on property than on any other
constitutional question. Out of nearly 20 recent cases,
12 were
decided by unanimous votes, and two others were decided 8-1 and
7-1.9
As to the permissible subjects of regulation, the Court has
reiterated recently the propriety of regulation of billboard
regulation for aesthetic purposes,10 open space zoning, historic
landmark
protection,
safeguarding
traditional
community
character, strip mine contour restoration, pesticide regulation,
wetland
development
restriction
and
endangered
species
protection. In Nollan, it assumed the validity of protecting
visual easements, and it cast no doubt on the use of subdivision
exactions and dedication requirements so long as there exists a
nexus between the problem creat~d and the exaction demanded.
It has also reiterated the economic viability test, which
has always been interpreted
to
permit
very considerable
diminutions of value. In one modern case after another--Penn
Central, Goldblatt and Andrus v. Allard--to take but three
examples, very considerable diminutions of value were held to be
constitutionally permissible. Moreover, the
of the Court
has this term cited with approval the century-old decision in
Mugler v. Kansasll~ which is usually understood to permit
unlimited diminution of value in order to serve a legitimate
police power purpose.
In the
unanimously

casel2 a few
extremely broad

years ago,
the Court
ic purpose test.

In
serie of usual
unanimous cases involving business
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costly
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- 33 demanded of
the owner's premises.l6 This perspective also
explains the deep split in the Court in the Penn Central case,
where the minority, led by Justice Rehnquist, insisted that the
owners were in effect being required to contribute their air
rights to the public, rather than being prevented from causing
some harm.
To anyone who saw the Court's taking cases evolving as I
have just described them,
the Nollan case was not a surprise.
The only question was whether the Court would buy the Coastal
Commission's nexus
argument, bringing the case within the
mainstream of subdivision exaction cases. Once it became clear
they would not, Nollan became a conventional "invasion" case,
doomed to defeat.
This reading of Nollan suggests that it is not the leading
edge of a significant reordering of property rights, but one more
of the fairly standard "anti-invasion" doctrine cases that are a
staple of Supreme Court property law.
There is, to be sure, another possible reading of the case.
Both Justice Rehnquist in the recent Keystone easel? and Justice
Scalia in Nollan have intimated that the Court is going to be
less deferential than it has in the past in accepting state or
local government justifications for regulation. Obviously Nollan
itself is an example of such increased judicial scrutiny, for
Justice Scalia simply would not accept the Coastal Commission's
assertion that lateral access was a suitable substitute for loss
of visual access.
Such heightened judicial inquiry into an
essentially factual and judgmental area was one ground for the
vigorous dissent in that case.
It would indeed be a dramatic change if the Supreme Court
began to give detailed scrutiny to the justifiability of various
state and local land use regulations. I doubt that such a change
is in the offing. My own reading of the Scalia opinion is that he
found the Coastal Commission's claim simply unbelievable. He
thought that if they wanted to protect visual access, they could
and should have done so directly. He believed, I think, that they
simply were determined to create a public right-of-way along the
beach, and had invented visual and psychological access as a
nexus when challenged.
Even if I am wrong, and there is an incipient majority that
believes greater judicial scrutiny is needed, I predict that such
a position will not last long. Once the Court opens the door to

16 Loretto
419 (1982).

v. Teleprompter

Manhatten CATV Corp., 458 U.S.

17. 55 U.S. Law Week, at 433 7 (" ... legitimacy of this
purpose is a question of federal, rather than state, law, subject
to independent scrutiny by this Court.").
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COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
OFFICE OF THE COUNTY COUNSEL
648 HALL OF ADMINISTRATION
500 WEST TEMPLE STREET

LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90012
DE WITT W. CLINTON, COUNTY COUNSEL

August 6, 1987

(213) 974-1845

California Legislature
Senate Committee on
Local Government
Room 2080 State Capitol
Sacramento, California 95814
Attention:
Re:

Kaye Packard, Committee Secretary

Recent Land Use Opinion of the
United States Supreme Court

Dear Senators:
On behalf of the County of Los Angeles, we are submitting a
paper entitled "The First English Evangelical Lutheran Church
Case: What Did It Actually Decide?" for consideration by the
Senate Local Government Committee during its review of
California land use regulations on August 13, 1987.
Very

By
CHARLES J. MOORE
Principal Deputy
County Counsel
CJM/fsl
Enclosure
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THE FIRST ENGLISH EVANGELICAL LUTHERhN
CHURCH CASE:

WHAT DID IT ACTUALLY DECIDE?
BY JACK R. WHITE*

INTRODUCTION
On June 9,

1987,

the United States Supreme Court

issued its decision in the case of .:F:-'i""_r_c__s__t_:__ :c__ ___ ~_l_;__:i;'3]_:1 __E:_vang:~_lical
les.

Lutheran Church of Glendale

By

judgment in favor of the County in an inverse condemnation
action in which the Church claims that its property was
"taken" without payment of just compensation by a temporary
County f ood protection zoning ordinance.

The decision has

been described in most news media reports as a "landmark
decision" and "major victory" for landov1ners which is likely
to have an enormous
Unfortunately,
re not a

*

t

on

ocal governments.

the media descr

accurate and many we

ions of the case

so crypti

as to be

The author a
the Firs
lish case on behalf of
the County of Los Ange es in the United States Supreme
Court.
He is a partner i
the Los
les law firm of
Hill, Farrer & Burrill.
The firm has represented the
County in numerous land use and zoning liti
ion
matters, but it also regularly represents private
property owners and real estate developers in such
matters.
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misleading.

As a result, a great deal of misinformation has

been circulated and much confusion and misunderstanding
prevails as to what the Court actually decided and, equally
as important, what it did not decide.

For example, an

article about the case appearing in the Los Angeles Herald
Examiner on June 10, 1987, stated,
"Zoning laws that restrict landowners'
use of their property, even temporarily,
are the equivalent of a 'taking' of private
land for public use, 'for which the
Constitution clearly requires
compensation,' the court said."
Taken literally, that would mean that compensation is now
constitutionally required for virtually
That is not what the Court held.

al~

zoning measures.

Nor did the Court hold that

flood protection and other health and safety restrictions on
land use constitute a taking for which compensation must be
paid, as some other reports have suggested.
What the Court did decide was a narrow point of
constitutional law which now requires the California courts
to reconsider the Church's inverse condemnation claim, but
which ultimately should have no effect at all on the result.
In a nutshell, the Court concluded that the California courts
had incorrectly interpreted the Constitution when they
established a rule to the effect that a landowner who claims
his property has been "taken" by a zoning or other land use
regulation, may not sue for compensation in inverse

- 38 -

condemnation, but must instead seek judicial invalidation of
the offending

Chief Justice Rehnquist and the

five Justices

joined with him disagreed with that rule

and held that the Fifth and Fourteenth l-\mendments to the
United States Constitution require that the landowner be
permitted to sue for damages suffered during the time the
offending regulation is in effect before it is finally
determined by the courts to be a "taking.!!

This period of

time during which the offending regulation is in effect
before it is declared to be a taking, was characterized by
the

Court majority as a Htemporary taking."

Hence,

the case firmly establishes the precedent that damages may
now be recovered for so-called "

Before I

to

rary regulatory

ain what I think this

means, or we engage in any speculation as to what the
ruling's actual impact may be on zoni
p actices,

I believe it will put ever

policies and
ng into bett.er

perspective if we first examine the history of the temporary
taki

issue and see how it came before the Court in

this particular case.
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PREVIOUS UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
DECISIONS CONCERNING REGULATORY TAKINGS
AND CALIFORNIA'S AGINS RULE.

(a)

Regulatory Takings In General.

The notion that a land use regulation may
constitute a "taking" of property within the meaning of the
Fifth Amendment is, of course, nothing new.

Since its

decision in Pennsylvania Coal Company v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393
(1922),

the Supreme Court repeatedly has said that a state

(or federal) police power regulation of property which "goes
too far" will be recognized as an unconstitutional "taking"
of such property.l/

It is equally well-established, however,

that not every destruction or injury to property by
governmental action results in a "taking" in the
constitutional sense.~/

--------·---

l/

E.g. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S.
, 91 L.Ed.2d 285 (1986); Williamson County Reg.
P an. Comm. v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S.
, 87 L.Ed.2d
126 (1985}; Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164
(1979).

~/

Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83
(1980); Andrus v. Allard, 441 U.S. 51, 65 (1979).

-

In numerous deci
case, the Court
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s preceding the First

ledged that the difficult problem

always is how to define

too far," that is, "to distinguish

the point at which a regulation becomes so onerous that it
ation of the property

has the same effect as an
through eminent domain or physica

possession "

3

The Court

further admitted that it has thus far been unable to develop
any "set formula" for the resolution of this issue.

Instead,

the answer depends largely upon the particular circumstances
of each case and calls for essentially

~q

hoc factual

inquiries to balance public and private interests.

The

bottom line question has been said to be •.vhether, under all
of the circumstances, the particular restriction on private
property forces some people alone to bear public burdens
which,

in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the

public as a whole.
In its 1978 decision in
tion Co. v. New York Ci

438 U.S. 104 (1978), the Court

identified what it called three
this ad hoc factual inquiry:
governmental action"i

rta-

relevant considerations" for

(a) the

!!

character of the

(b) the "economic impact of the
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regulation on the claimant"; and (c) the "extent to which the
regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed
expectations."

In subsequent decisions, the Court has

consistently reiterated what it said in Penn Central and has
tried to apply those three factors to the particular facts
and circumstances of the case.
In Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980),
the Supreme Court repeated much of what I have said above,
but also expressed a simplified version of the rule to be
applied when there is a mere facial attack on a particular
zoning ordinance - that is, where it is claimed that the mere
enactment of the ordinance effects a taking of a landowner's
property.

That rule is, "[t]he application of a general

zoning law to particular property effects a taking if the
ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state
interests
use of his land

or denies an owner economically viable
"

While the opinion itself does not

make it entirely clear what the Court meant by

11

economically

viable use," when the result in that case is considered along
with other decisions of the Court, most legal commentators
have interpreted this to mean that substantially all
economically feasible use must be denied before it can be
found that there has been a taking.

In

~gips,

that a zoning ordinance which, on its face,

the Court held

allowed some

development of the plaintiff's property (at least one single
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ordinance was a taking.

The California Supreme Court held

that the property owner could not bring an inverse
condemnation action under such circumstances because
requiring the local government to pay for the property (if
the ordinance was held to a taking) would have the effect of
forcing the local government to exercise its power of eminent
domain.

The California Supreme Court felt that it was

improper for courts to interfere with the local government's
prerogative in that fashion.

Accordingly, the court held

that the property owner's remedy for the claimed taking was
limited to bringing a declaratory relief or mandamus action
to have the ordinance declared invalid and unenforceable, if
it amounted to a taking in violation of the Fifth

Amendment.~/
Thus, it is important to note that the California
Supreme Court did not hold that a public entity may take
private property by regulatory action and keep it without
paying for it, as some commentators have suggested.

Rather,

the clear effect of the decision was that if the regulation
was found to go "too far'' and was declared to be a taking, it
could not thereafter be enforced unless the public entity
elected to exercise its power of eminent domain and pay

~/

Agins v. City of Tiburon (1979) 23 Cal.3d 266, 157
Cal.Rptr. 372.
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compensation to the prope
In

owner.

ns, the prope

owner did also assert a

claim for declaratory relief, by which he sought to have the
zoning ordinance declared invalid.

Because of the presence

of that claim, the California Supreme Court went on to
discuss the merits of the alleged taking.

The court rejected

the claim on the ground that the ordinance merely caused a
diminution in the value of the property, at the most, and did
not amount to a taking.
As mentioned previously, when the case reached the
United States Supreme Court on appeal,

that Court agreed with

the California Supreme Court that no taking had been
adequately all

because the ordinance, on its face,

that some development of the property was permissible.

permit, it was impossible to know what

any devel

the ultimate economic
owner would be.

The

owner had not

Court also observed that because the prope
s

showed

t of the ordinance on the property

In any event, since it agreed

regulatory taking/ the

reme Court sa d

to consider whether the California

t~ere

was no

t was unnecessary

reme Court's holding

limiting the remedy for a regulatory taking was
constitutionally correct.
In three sub

decisions coming before the

United States Supreme Court, the

question was

presented agai , but not decided for various procedural
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reasons which the Court said prevented it from knowing
whether a taking had actually occurred.

However, in the

first of those cases, San Diego Gas & Electric Company v.
San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981), Justice Brennan wrote a
dissenting opinion which was joined by three other justices.
In his dissent, Justice Brennan expressed the view that the
Agins rule limiting a property owner's remedy to invalidation
of a regulation which amounts to a taking was
constitutionally inadequate because it did not compensate the
property owner for his loss of the use of his property
during the time the regulation was in effect before it was
declared to be valid.

It is essentially that view that the

six justice majority adopted in the First English case.
In the two cases that followed San Diego Gas in the
United States Supreme Court/

Willia~son

County Reg. Plan.

Comm. v. Hamilton Bank, supra, and MacDonald Sommer &
Frates v. County of Yolo, supra, there were again dissenting
opinions by various combinations of justices who wished to
reach the remedy question and who expressed the view that the
Agins rule was incorrect.

By the time the First English case

reached the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Brennan, White, Powell, and Marshall had all voted against
the Agins rule in various dissenting opinions, though not all
in the same case.

Thus, unless one of those justices changed

his mind, it appeared that the Agins rule would be held

-

nva

f
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the

a

l

is st!e

ous cases beginning

But in each of the four
with

of the justi es had exhibited an

ori

a

extreme reluctance to reach the
was presented with a case
regulatory action.

d be

issue until the Court

ch involved an actual taking by

Unfortunately, that judicial restraint
case.

did not carry over to the First
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General Plan maps as being reserved for open space purposes
including outdoor recreation and resource production and
preservation.

The Church has never challenged these

classifications.
The Church acquired the property in 1957 and over
the next 20 years built various structures and recreational
facilities on the premises using mostly donated labor and
services.

The property, which was known as "Lutherglen," was

used as a weekend retreat and summer camp for Church members
and their guests and as a year-around camping facility for
handicapped children and adults of all denominations.

All of

the structures except for some water tanks were located on 12
acres of relatively flat land at the bottom of the canyon,
along both sides of Mill Creek.

The remainder of the

Church's 21 acres has higher elevations with varying degrees
of slope, most of which probably would be too steep to be
tab

as building sites unless cost was no object.

The

structures on the canyon bottom consisted of a single cabin
which served as the residence of the caretaker; a main lodge
used for dining and recreationi a dormitory or bunk house
divided into two sections with attached shower and restroom
facilitiesi

a swimming pool, volleyball court, outdoor

chapel, and a footbridge across the creek.

There were also

some moveable trailers on the property which were used to
house the camp's staff.

-
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to note, then, that the available

rt

uses for Lutherglen were quite limited because of its
and the underl

ocation,

ng zoning, even before

the County adopted the flood protection ordinance which the
Church contends was a taking of the property.

Unfortunately,

even those limited uses proved to be very dangerous.
It is common knowledge in California that flash
floods occur in the mountain canyons during periods of heavy
rains and that such floods represent a serious hazard to
human life and property.

Indeed, when the structures were

construcLed on Lutherglen, the County required the Church to
t

do a number of things to
erosion.

This included the cons ruction of a floodwall along
and the construction of the

one side of the prope
foo

against flooding and

dge as a "bre

bri

which would

easily from its foundation in the event of a flood.
to

This was

the bridge from building up a large volume of

water before fina

y

ving way, the

surge of water downstream.

caus ng a sudden

Despite these precautions,

several of the structures on Lutherglen were severely
damaged, though not de
canyon in 1969.

, w.hen a flood occurred in the

At that time, the

to rebuild the
In late Jul

a lowed the Church

st
of

977,

a fire occurred in the

les National Forest causing a

or loss of watershed
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which, in turn, magnified the already existing danger of
flooding in the Mill Creek area.

Shortly after the fire, the

Los Angeles County Flood Control District warned all of the
property owners in the area that there was a significant
flood hazard.

The predicted flash flood came between 1:30 to

2:30 in the morning of February 10, 1978, after two days of
It was devastating.

very heavy rain.

A massive wall of

water, mud and debris rushed down Mill Creek Canyon
destroying all of the camps and other properties in the
canyon bottom.
obliterated.

Lutherglen's structures were totally
Ten people were killed on adjacent property.

It was only through sheer fortuity that no deaths occurred at
Lutherglen.

Lutherglen had been scheduled to be used on

February 10, 1978, by a group of handicapped children, but
their camping trip had been postponed for one week.

(b)

The County's Flood Protection Ordinances.

On January 11, 1979, the County adopted the
temporary flood protection ordinance which wa·s the subject of
the Church's suit.

The ordinance recited that it was ''[a]n

interim ordinance temporarily prohibiting the construction,
reconstruction, placement or enlargement of any building or
structure within any portion of the interim flood protection
area delineated within Mill Creek, vicinity of Hidden
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provisions of California law applicable to "interim zoning
ordinances" which take effect immediately as an urgency
measure "to protect public safety, health and welfare."

Such

measures expire automatically after four months unless they
are extended in accordance with certain statutory procedures.
The maximum period of time such an ordinance could remain in
effect, if so extended, was two years.

The County Board of

Supervisors did extend the ordinance for the maximum period.
A permanent ''flood protection district" was then established
and added to the County's zoning code by an ordinance adopted
on August 11, 1981.
The geographical boundaries of the permanent flood
protection district were identical to those of the interim
flood protection ordinance which it superseded.

The flood

protection area consisted of a linear shaped parcel
approximately 250 feet in width and 3600 feet in length which
followed the course of the existing creek channel and
included additional area on both sides of the channel to
provide reasonable protection from overflow of flood waters,
bank erosion and debris deposition.

Because of the

narrowness of the Canyon at the Church's property, all of the
Church's twelve acres of flat land were included within the
flood protection area.

The provisions of the permanent

ordinance were drafted to comply with the federal flood
insurance regulations and have been accepted by the federal
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government

s

ng i

comp

e wi

those re

a

ons.

as were those of the interim

ordinance are not as restr c

ordinance, but there is no doubt that they would prohibit

~he

Church from rebuilding Lutherglen the way it was before the
flood.

Since the Church has never applied for permission

to build anything on the property under the permanent
ordinance, we do not know what kinds of structures would be
am informed by the

Engineer.

permitted

the

County's

neers, however, that

are of the

nion

constructed on the

that some structures cou d safely

property under the permanent ordinance, but

acknowledge

that it could be more cost y than if the Church was permitted
to build the way it di

before; and it is not likely that the

Church would be able to bui d al

o

the structures that

that the area within the
by the
Flood Control
ood hazard."
District as being
ec
ts the construction or
The ordinance
reconstruction of any building or structure within the
boundaries of the district exc
as spec fied therein.
One of the exc
ons pe
ts 11 acces ory buildings or
structures that wil not substantial y
the flow
of water, including
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neer" pursuant to
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Building Code.
Those
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t any
construction in a severe flood hazard area, if such
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The permanent ordinance
flood
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s
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existed before.

Despite these restrictions, which the County

believes are essential for safety purposes, the County
contends the property is still usable for recreation and
camping purposes consistent with its underlying zoning
classification.

Many campgrounds are used in California with

no structures at all; or with only restroom and shower
facilities, which the County would probably permit the Church
to build on Lutherglen, if adequate safety precautions were
taken.

(c)

The Church's Suit And The Proceedings In The State
Court.

The Church did not wait to find out what type of
structure might be permitted on Lutherglen under the
permanent flood protection ordinance.

Instead, the Church

commenced its lawsuit on February 21, 1979, a little over a
month after the temporary ordinance was first enacted.

The

Church sued both the County and the Los Angeles County Flood
Control District, which was then a separate governmental
entity, claiming that they were responsible for the damage
caused by the February 10, 1978 flood under a variety of
different legal theories, including inverse condemnation and
tort liability.

In addition, the Church asserted an inverse

condemnation claim against the County based on the allegation
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appealed to the California Court of Appeals.
By the time the case reached the California Court
of Appeals, Agins had been affirmed by the United States
Supreme Court without reaching the remedy question and the
San Diego Gas case had been decided, also without reaching
the remedy question.

But because of Justice Brennan's

dissent in San Diego Gas, the Church argued to the California
Court of Appeals that the Agins remedy rule was incorrect and
should not be followed.

The California Court of Appeals

disagreed and held that until the United States Supreme Court
finally decided the question, it was obligated to follow the
California Supreme Court's Agins decision.

Based on that

ruling, the appellate court affirmed the lower court's order
striking the regulatory taking claim.
It is important to note that neither the lower
court nor the Court of Appeal ever discussed the sufficiency
of the Church's allegations to state a claim for a regulatory

taking.~/

~/

Likewise, they did not address the health and

Since the Church never sought to amend its complaint to
state a claim for declaratory relief or mandamus, as
permitted under the Agins rule, the California courts
were not required to consider whether the Church had
alleged sufficient facts to establish a regulatory
taking, as the courts did in Agi~§Nor did the Church
ever amend its complaint to claim a regulatory taking
based on the County's permanent flood protection
ordinance. At all stages of the proceeding, the suit
was based solely on the temporary ordinance.

-
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safety justification for the County's temporary flood
protection ordinance.
Church's all

In essence, both courts regarded the

ions as being irrelevant regardless of

whether they were sufficient to state a meritorious claim,
because the Church had sought an

rmissible remedy.

It

was this procedural quirk that the United States Supreme
Court majority siezed upon to justify reaching the remedy
question in this case after it had ducked the issue in four
previous cases.

(d)

The

United States

Court And

The Issues And Contentions Of The Parties.

After the Church's petition for a hearing in the
California Supreme Court was denied,

leaving the

dec~sion

of

the California Court of Appeals to stand as the tinal state
court ruling in the matter, the Church then appealed to the
United States

Court, invoking the Court's appellate

jurisdiction rather than ce

iorari jurisdiction.

\·Jhereas

certiorari jurisdiction is entirely discret1onary with the
Court, it must hear appeals if the requistte conditions for

I and my firm were
to represent the County in
this case when it reached the United States Supreme
Court.
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appellate jurisdiction are present.

In essence, appellate

jurisdiction exists whenever a state statute or local
government ordinance is challenged as being repugnant to the
United States Constitution and is upheld by a state court as
being constitutional.
In its jurisdictional statement to the United
States Supreme Court, the Church claimed that all of the
requisites for appellate jurisdiction were present.

Yet, the

thrust of the Church's arguments were not really aimed at
challenging the validity or constitutionality of the County's
temporary flood protection ordinance at all.

Rather, the

Church aimed all of its guns at the claimed invalidity of the
Agins rule.

One of the arguments we made on behalf of the

County in the Supreme Court was that the jurisdictional
requirements for appellate jurisdiction were not present
here, as the Church claimed, but the Supreme Court majority
disagreed.

We believe the Court's reasoning on that point

(as well as on several others) was incorrect, but that is now
ancient history.
In view of the fact noted previously that five of
the present Supreme Court justices had already indicated
their disagreement with the Agins rule in various dissenting
opinions, it appeared that the Court would probably decide
that the Agins rule was incorrect if a majority of the
justices voted to reach the remedy issue.

But it also
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also that the Court itself had recognized in previous
decisions that such ordinances are entitled to special
consideration and carry with them a presumption of validity
which can be overcome only by a showing that the ordinance
was actually adopted for some other improper purpose, or that
it imposes restrictions which are more onerous than what is
reasonably necessary to meet the particular peril.

In the

instant case, the Church alleged no facts which would
overcome this presumption of validity.

At no time has the

Church ever contended that the flood protection ordinance was
adopted for an improper purpose or that the restrictions
imposed are more onerous than what is reasonably necessary to
protect against the hazard of future flooding.
We further pointed out in our arguments to the
Court that under these precedents going back at least 100
years, reasonable regulations prohibiting only dangerous uses
of property are not considered to be takings for a public
purpose in the constitutional sense, and compensation to the
affected property owner is not required.lQ/

lQ/

The cases we relied upon are all cited with approval in
footnote 4 of the dissenting opinion by Justice Stevens
in First English.
The most recent case on the subject,
Keystone Coal Association v. De Benedictis, supra, was
decided only three months prior to First English, and
fully supports the County's position, just as Justice
Stevens states in his dissent.

-

Another

60 -

its amici was that the
of the prope

advanced by the County and

or a

had not in fact denied all use

to the Church.

The Church sued solely on the

temporary ordinance which did no more than temporarily
prohibit the building of any structures in the canyon bottom
until the matter could be studied and a permanent ordinance
The Church did not allege any facts to show why its

adopted.

property could not still be used for recreational purposes,
including camping, without structures.

Furthermore, the

permanent ordinance, which the Church has never challenged,
plainly allows some structures to be built if the County
ineer is satisfied that
employed.

ate safety measures can be

The Church has never even tried

~o

see what would

be permitted under the permanent ordinance.
In contrast with these
a

s, most of the

the Church and its many amici curiae

s advanced

rule without

challenge the correctness of the
regard to the actual facts of this
a

art cular case.

that the Court could and should decide the remedy

i sue without deciding whether the:t'e was actually a taking in
this case, because the California courts had done so.
answer to that was that even
not decided whether there was a taki
coul

see for itself,

properly alleged;

Our

the California courts had
the

reme Court

as a matter of law, that no taking was

and the question of what the proper remedy
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should be for a regulatory taking should not be decided in a
case where no taking could possibly have occurred under the
facts appearing in the record.

To decide the remedy question

under such circumstances would be the equivalent of rendering
an advisory opinion, in a vacuum, which could only cause
further confusion and uncertainty.
Finally, the County urged that if the Court should
decide to reach the remedy question in this case, it should
hold that the Agins rule was correct.

We argued that a

property owner should not be able to sue immediately for
compensation in inverse condemnation for an alleged
regulatory taking, but rather he should be required to sue to
have the regulation invalidated for all of the reasons given
by the California Supreme Court.

We also pointed out that

the question of whether a property owner should be able to
recover some compensation for the claimed loss of use of his
property during the period the regulation was in effect prior
to its being declared invalid, was never actually raised or
decided in

~ins

or in the present case.

The County, and all

of its amici curiae, argued that it is a misnomer to call
that temporary loss of use of the property a "temporary
taking," because it is not really a ''taking" at all under the
Court's many earlier precedents.
Based on those existing precedents, the County
argued that a zoning ordinance or other land use regulation
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e

all use of
ng short

the land to the prope

of that is a mere diminution in value and not the equivalent
of an appropriation of
The

rary loss

prope

on the l andmvne r
delay

evel

the numerou

that nature have never been considered to
f a taki

again, because, at the most,

represent a mere diminution
prope

other kinds of

which are inherent in the regulatory

Delays o

rise to the

imposes no economic burden

effec

fferent

in devel

process.

during the time an

f use of the prope

excessive regulation is i

lie purpcse.

for a

as disti

shed

n the value of the
destruc ion of al

a

lue.

e)

Remain

The

opin
a

ion in this case
decide whether a
a

all

had been

as

esti

for

l

the Ca ifornia courts did
curred.
i

ions of the c

th

lf

The Court

jected

ate the

term ne whethe

a

taking"

rt reasoned that because
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the California courts had relied on the Agins rule as the
sole basis for their decision, they apparently assumed that
the Church's bare allegation of a denial of all use of
Lutherglen sufficiently alleged a taking to at least raise
the remedy question.
the same thing.

The Supreme Court felt that it could do

It then proceeded to decide that the Agins

rule was incorrect.
In so doing, however, the opinion by Justice
Rehnguist makes it abundantly clear that the majority was not
deciding whether the County's temporary flood protection
ordinance actually denied all use of the property- i.e.,
whether it actually effected a taking.

The Court further

stated that it was not deciding whether the ordinance was
insulated from the taking claim as part of the County's
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au~hority

to enact safe

as being an

l

l 1

regulations.-~/

.

We interpret that

the majority of the

correctness of the County's legal argument that a regulation
which prevents a dangerous use of prope

is not a

compensable taking.

.1

The court simply felt

•ty

could ignore

that point and proceed to decide the remedy que::::c:ion because
of the manner in which the case had been decided by the
California courts.

In essence, the Court obviously believed

it was presented with a golden opportunity to put the remedy
question to rest once and for all, \vi thout actua ly having to

11/

The exact language of
Court's
nion on this point
reads as follows:
11
1rle reject c:.ppellee' s suggestion that,
ess of the state court's treatment of the
on, we must i
ly evaluate the
y of the complaint and resolve the takings
claim on the merits before we can reach the
remedial question.
However 'crypt:.ic' - to use
appellee's descr
ion- the allegations with
respect to the taking were, the California coqrts
deemed them sufficient to present the isst:e.
\Ale
accordingly have no occasion to decide whether the
ordinance at issue ac ally denied appe lant all
use of its property or \vhether the County might
avoid the conclusion that a compensable taking had
occurred by establishing that the denial of all use
was insulated as a
of the state's authority to
regulati
s.
c-:--::-----::---··------,..-~·--a
__d
__ ,
----=~~----=-c:.:_::__::c_.:.::___:_.:__..:cs'-e~b:=_:_a:..s,'- .....-=-'-.=i_a,:. .:. .cn ,

369 U S .

0

( 19 62 ) ;

2 3 9 U . S . 3 9 4 ( 1 9 15 )i
Kansas,
3 U.S. 623 (1887).
These
----,--------:---questions, of course, remain open for decision on
the remand we direct today."
(sl
op. at 7-8)
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find fault with the County's ordinance.
In deciding the remedy issue, the Supreme Court
first interpreted the California Court of Appeals' decision
in this case as holding that a landowner who claims his
property has been taken by a land use regulation may not
recover damages for the time before it is finally determined
that the regulation constitutes a taking of his property.
Actually, as I have already mentioned, that precise question
was not presented or decided in the lower courts in this
case, nor was it presented or decided in
case and

ns.

In both this

ns, the landowners sought compensation only for

-~'-----

an alleged permanent taking of their property without ever
specifically asking for damages limited to the time prior to
the court's ruling on whether there was a taking.

Nor was

there any discussion in either case as to whether a

In contrast, the dissent
Justices Stevens, O'Connor
and Blackmun was extreme
critical of the
ority's
decision precisely because the majority decided the
issue in a case where it was clear that no taking
possibly
occurred.
As Justice Stevens put
Even
I believe the Court's lack of
self restraint is imprudent, it is imperative to
stress that the Court does not hold that appellant
is entitled to compensation as a result of the
ood protection regulation the County enacted. No
reatter whether the regulation is treated as one
that
rives appellant of its property on a
permanent or temporary basis, this Court's
precedents demonstrate that the type of regulatory
program at issue here cannot constitute a taking."

-

" emporary taking"
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ould have occurred duri

that interim

period of time.
Nevertheless, the
be the real issue -

I~_:_,

Court considered that to
v.Tong on

whether the

the ground that the constitution mandates the payment of
compensation for the period of time
determination that the

to a judicial

rmanent regulation (if allowed to

stand) would effect a taking.

On that issue. the Court

rejected all of our arguments as to why there should be no
taking at all where nothing more has occut-red than a
temporary loss of use of the property, or a
The majori

development of the property.
no difference between a

d~lay

in

said it could see

rary denial of all use of the

property and a permanent taking.
compensation was required for a
then compensation must also be

The Court reasoned that if
rary
d for a

rary

l
t cry ta k.lng. 1
reguLa

The

1

ori

oncluded, however,

s

ng t.hat

The dissenting
nion
stice Stevens
with
the County's argument that there is a significant
difference between a
sical taking of property and one
which occurs so ely by virtue of restraints on the use
of property imposed under a la::1d use regulation; and
that no regulatory taking should be found to occur where
there has merely been a diminution in \"alue caused by a
loss of all se of prope
, as distinguished
total destruction of value which would result
from a
rmanent ass of al use.
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''[w]e limit our holding to the facts presented, and of course
do not deal with the quite different questions that would
arise in the case of normal delays in obtaining building
permits, changes in zoning ordinances, variances, and the
like which are not before us."

What this means is anything

but clear, since the Court had alre

said earlier in its

opinion that it was not deciding whether there was a taking
in this case.
One possible interpretation of the majority opinion
v!ould be that

temporary denial of all use of property can

be regarded as a taking for which compensation must be paid,
no matter how short in duration the loss of use may be or
what it is that causes the temporary loss of use.
means, it would seem that every 1
moratoria and other
re
re

cting
+v

l'

not thi

be vulnerab e to attack and could

for the adopting

position of having to deal
occurred in a
Co~rt

ic entity.

But I do

that is what the Court would actually hold if it

were faced with such a question.

the

timate building

of proper interim ordinances

and use mi

liabili

If that is

Once the Court is put in a

th whether a taking has actually

cular situation,

will modi

1

I think it is likely that

or at least clari

, some of the

overbroad language it used in this case to bring the decision
more in line

ith some of the Court s

the subject of regulatory takings.

ous holdings on

-
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Assuming there is a legitimate purpose for a
temporary land use restriction, and that the restriction is
not to remain in effect for an undue length of time or for an
indefinite period, the Court should hold that there is no
taking because nothing more than a diminution in value has
occurred.

Since there is no total destruction of the value

of the property, the public interest should be deemed to
outweigh the private interest.

In essence, this should be

regarded as a "normal delay" in the right to develop property
of the type that must be expected in a regulated society.
Certainly, this should be the result in any case where the
Court considers the three factors first identified in the
Penn Central case, discussed above.
On the other hand, unless the Court modifies its
opinion in a subsequent case, it clearly must be read to
stand for the proposition that if a

regulation goes

too far and would amount to a taking if it is allowed to
tand, the landowner will then be entitled to recover damages
for the interim period of time that the re<Julation is in
effect before it is judicially declared to be a taking and is
abandoned by the public entity.

Accordingly,

something like

a permanent open space zoning ordinance which denied a
property owner any economical viable use of his land would
almost certainly result in some monetary award against the
local government that adopted it.

How that amount would be
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determined will have to await further judicia

explanation,

on that point.

however, since the Court gave no
To conclude, then, it is my

ction that the

First English case ultimately should not result in actual
liability being imposed on local governments in any but the
most egregious cases of over zealous zoning.

So long as some

economically viable use is available to a 1

1

should have no taking claim for zoning
down zoning, if 1

s, including

timate reasons exist for such changes.

see nothing in the
Court i

he

case

I

ch indicates that

going to be any more willing to second guess the

decisions of land use planners a

to what constitutes a

timate z
Court has
pay for it.
that

y said if you go
No new l i

, you will have to

ally been shed on when or how

has

oc
The

nc

from the -----------~----First
ish

1

decision is that it may well set off the liti
p

cted

to defend
li

Justice Stevens'

ssent.

on explosion

The threat of having

nst such suits and the exposure to possible

lity may cause

p anning is i

and use planners to

1 c's l

to meet the
fully,

some of the unanswered

uncertainties created by the
resolved in later court ru ings.

so timid that

ori
I

timate needs.
stions and
will be

the meantime,

and use
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planners certai l

must be more circumspect about the

consequences of their actions, but at the same
guard against becoming overly cautious.
practices which did not "take" prope

should

Good zoning
prior to the .first

lish case should remain perfectly safe, as well as
desirable, in the aftermath of that decision.
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having to defend
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unproductive, is causi

ies to reflect upon the
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inadequate California laws concerning attorneys' fees awards.
We believe that

•s statutory authority for awards

i

of attorneys' fees

sed, in light of the predicted

and unproductive lit
revisions whi

ion, although

we

ng

n

three
are already

overdue.
The Private Attor

, as codified in Code of
021.5

izes an award of
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necessity and

st

...;...............;.._

32 Cal. 3d 621.
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i
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a courts have not recently

is issue,

award is wholly

ted States Supreme Court has

virtually elimi

use

a fee multiplier in federal

cases.
In considering the issue of enhancement of a base fee
or lodestar figure (i.e.,

number of hours actually worked

times a reasonable

rate), the California courts

traditionally have considered whether (1) some enhancement of the
historical rate is necessary to account for the delay in payment
and (2) whether an

ti

multiplier is warranted because of

certain factors like the ri

involved, the skill of the

attorneys, the novelty or complexity of issues, and the results
no enhancement is warranted on either
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, 92 L.Ed.2d 439, 106 S.

No Cali

case has cons

enhancements and

• 3088(1986).
these issues relating to

tipliers

awards; the California

Legislature should act to

ication of multipliers

creating windfalls for

courts have said there

is no justifi
stat
at tor

s

1

fees for

on

counter

ion

s a

ive incentive

which
s

li

ious claims

of success.

The

ic enti ies' legal defense should
statute

i

to recover its attor

right
litigation

s

finance

it from a
public

unmeri

, if

i

lowance of

ic entities should also be

succes

a

nst

izes a successful
' fees where an important

ic interest is vindicated and the
ts

significant benefit on

by
public

ic entity confer a

78 -

HEARING BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE
ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT
COMMENTS OF TIMOTHY A. BITTLE
REGARDING NOLLAN v. CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION

13, 1987

RONALD A. ZUMBRUN
ROBERT K. BEST
TIMOTHY A. BITTLE
Pacific Legal Foundation
555 Capitol Mall, Suite 350
Sacramento, CA 95814
Telephone:
(916) 444-0154
Attorneys for Pacific Legal
Foundat

-

79 -

STEP 1
The constitu i
employed

the United States Supreme Court in Nollan v.

California
opinion.

is, or "test" if you prefer,

na

stal Cornmissi

begins at Section I I of the

The Court begins with a fundamental premise.

premise is that uncompensat

The

dedication requirements, standing

alone, are unconstitutional
"Had California simply required the
Nollans to make an easement across their
bea

front available to
conditioning

ir permit

doubt there would
Next,

lie ••• rather
we have no

been a taking."

the Court poses a question
"Gi

n, that requiring

cornpensat

nee of t

t

r

wou d
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ate the Fourteen

Amendme

ther

comes

t
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i
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a 1
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tcome.
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Cour

outcome.

assumes a set of facts that would alter
fica!
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denied
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rmit outright

wit
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r
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an outr g
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t
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ld leave the
d

se) and would not

lans with a

0 -
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e
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rmit outright ••• unless the
re so drastical

denial would
the Nollans
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r

with
as to

constitute a taking "

analysis.

as the "f rst step" of the Nollan

refer to the

I

ition to be lawful, it must
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first pass this s
have the lawf

t

r

is, the governmental agency must
rmit being applied for.

to deny

look at it this

s nee

at ion
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alone, are unconsti

iona ,

owner

a ri
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has a 1

r a

the owner's
"t

ir r

hts.

permit for the owner s

is

"trade,

ul right to
age

the owner accepts a
re err ng to it as a

r

t

to resist

the agency can agree to issue a

ct prov

dedication

I

that ded cation requirements can

be constitut

are mere

a substitute for denial.

Commission argues that a permit
condition

t serves the same legitimate

police

as a refusal to issue

the permit
if

not be found to be a taking

refusal to issue

constitute a

ing.

permit would not

We agree."

- 81 The Court's characterization provides an easy
transition into

"second s ep" of the Nollan analysis.
STEP 2

Having determined

t a permit denial would still
e economic use, and would not

leave the owner with a vi
substantially interfere wi

his reasonable investment-backed

expectations, it does not necessarily follow that his permit can
therefore be denied for

~

reason

For example, an agency

could not deny a permit because
could

agency de

icant was black.

a permi

pure

arbitrary reasons,

such as a feeling by

applicant was already

rich enough and did not need
by this project.
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Rather, a denial must substantially advance a

te state interest
We have long

nized
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Our cases have not ela
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te interest s tisf
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te state
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t constitutes a
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t land use

ffect a taking if it
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Nor
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They have made clear, however

that

t
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se requirements."
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that among these

Court ass

lan case

.:.;...;::..;;;;_:::...::.:..;..:.

es was the state's desire to protect public

permissible pu

views of the ocean.
Since

ication requirements are constitutional only

when they are a substitute

a lawful denial, then the

dedication requirement must substantially advance the same state
purpose that would justify an outright denial.

So, in the

Nollan case, the Supreme Court conceded that, if the Nollans'
permit could have been denied because their new house would
block public views, a dedication condition that preserved public
views would

constitut
, if

Commission attached to

the permit some condition that would have
protected the
beach notwi
house-wi

lie's ability to see the
i

constuction of the new

r example, a height limitation, a

restriction, or a ban on fences--so
as the Commission could have exercised

its police power (as we have assumed it
cou

) to forb

altogether,

ition of the condition would

also be constitut
constitut
if the

construction of the house

al
ition

ib t on utter

1 •••• The evident
iety disappears, however,
titu

for the

fa ls to further the end

- 83 advanced as the justification for the
prohibition

When t

essential nexus is

eliminated, the situation becomes the same as
if Cali

ia law forbade shouting fire in a

crowded theater, but granted dispensations to
those willing to contr bute $100 to the state
treasury."
Thus, to pass

"second step" of the Nollan

analysis, the agency imposing

permit condition must identify

a legitimate state interest that would justify denial of the
permit.

The dedication requirement must substantially advance

the same state interest.
people alre
s

a broader beach to walk on in no way

on the

ved the
new

dedication condition did not

se, t

vance the state's interest in view protection.

tantial
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e ocean views were blocked

motorists
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In the No lan case, since providing
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re failed.
LUSION

law.

It means t

appl cation,

t

en i

fee in lieu thereof
ollows:
its

an

if an
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ire no dedication conditions (or
A common situation is as

cant owns one single-family lot.

1 size, it is unsuitab

residential use.

single-family home

sis is brand new

ncy cannot say "no" to a permit

whatsoever.

residential development.
fami

the Nollan ana

II

The "first s

Because of

any purpose other than

It is

exclusively for singleapplies for a permit to build a

one use his

r

is zoned for and

- 84 suitable for, the permitting age
to say "no" to
the owner

t permit

lication.

To do so would leave

economic use for his land.

th no vi

agency does not

does not have a lawful right

ld the ri

nothing to trade with.

Since the

to deny the permit, it has

Therefore, the agency cannot require a

owner for park purposes, street-widening

dedication from

purposes, or any other purpose.

Fees in lieu of a dedication

cannot be imposed either.
The "second s

• of the Nollan analysis also

dramatically alters the law, at least in California.

Whereas in

Grupe v. California Coastal Commission, 166 Cal. App. 3d 148
(1985), the California Court of Appeal held that dedication
requirements were

ul even if the project standing alone had

not created the need
on

an indirect relationsh

between the dedication condition
ect contributed.

and a need to which
condition must

dedication, and even if there was

tantial
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nee some state interest which

is strong enough to justify denial of the permit altogether.
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•THE LIMITS OF LAND USE REGULATION•
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on in considerably more detail is attached as

exhibit "A" to this testimony.)
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practices of land use officials.

How those individuals will

perceive the mandate of those decisions is more uncertain.
Most fundamentally, under First Lutheran public officials will
henceforth be unable to err on the side of "overregulation" of
land--however innocently--without being liable for money damages.

As noted in response to the previous question, following Nollan
planning officials will be required to predicate project
conditions on findings that the development has impacts somewhat
more directly related to the conditions imposed.
may thus

A clearer nexus

required than was previously thought necessary by

some planners.

A collateral point is that public agencies may

attempt to adopt more specific findings to support project
conditions than were developed in the past.
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Will officials change their practices regarding access

to navigable waterways,
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ong the coast?

It is of course too early to determine with any
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certainty whether the recent Supreme Court decisions will have a
major impact on government efforts to promote public access to
California's navigable waterways.
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developed in Keystone.
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temporary taking cannot be deemed to commence prior to the time
of such administrative action.

a.

How can landowners and public officials distinguish

between "normal delays" in the land development process and
delays that lead to regulatory takings?
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ResRonse:

See response to question S(b) above.

Certain aspects

of the state Eminent Domain Law (Code of Civil Procedure
1230.010) may prove relevant.

§

Reliance on that statute should

not be overstressed, however, since conventional condemnation
principles are often not applicable in the regulatory takings
context.

9.

If a state regulation is found to be a temporary regulatory

taking, what is the State General Fund's exposure?

ResRonse:

Like any judgment entered against the state, a damages

award based on a regulatory takings claim would require a
specific legislative appropriation for payment.
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that the building industry sees this as an opportune time to
challenge such fees.

A number of lawsuits challenging school

developer fees, for example, have been filed in the last two
months.

Perhaps the sole relevance of Nollan to these cases will be to
encourage public officials to document further the connection
between the exaction fee imposed and impacts attributable to a
particular development.

11.

The traditional test of levying benefit assessments is that

landowners must pay in proportion to the benefit conferred on
their property by the facility or service being financed.

a.

Is the "nexus" discussed in Nollan any different?

Yes.
asses

The existing statutory scheme for benefit

s contains its own set of standards and limitations.

er

As a

inciple, the connection between such assessments

and a particular development must be quite direct.

(See, e.g.,

v. County of San Diego, 146 Cal.App.3d 772
(1983) )

The nexus required under Nollan and similar cases is

less direct and may be predicated upon the cumulative as well as
i

dual effects of a given project.

b.

What can landowners and land use regulators learn from

assessment practices that will help them

nd this nexus?
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Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
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that "If regulatoo far it will be
as a taking." In Penn·
the Court struck
as such a
a Pennstatute
had proin a manner
of land
caused
on which certain structures were
located. Three
later,
was still
c aracterized
as
the
"cornerstone" of federal takings
uri
least until
crucial Supreme
in this field is
Transportation Co.
of New York, 438 U.S. 104
Penn Central
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first
an analytical
In which to view
claims that
regulaeffect an unconstitutional
There the Court identified
relevant factors "[t]he
economic
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tent to which the
erfered with
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of Law
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private
fact are the
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the Supreme
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decision
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ia.
Le is at re enactec
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inous Mine Subsidence
and Land
Act. The
Act was a reaction to a rather
dramatic environmental and safe·
hazard
from the
of western

as a party. While the PennCoal decision contains
concerning the alleged
purpose of the statute involved, Keystone characterizes
this "uncharacteristic . . . advisory
nion" by Justice
Holmes.
U.S.l.W. at 4330.
Relying on the stated public purpose of the 1966 Act to
distinguish It from the private
controversy at the heart of Pennsylvania Coal, Justice Stevens
concluded that "the similarities
[between the two cases] are far
less significant than the differences, and that Pennsylvania
Coal does not control this case."
55 U.S.L.W. at 4329. Thus Justice
Stevens effectively transforms
the "cornerstone" of takings
jurisprudence into mere dictum.
The Keystone decision next
proceeded to apply the Penn Central criteria to the stated facts. It
is here that Keystone takes on its
greatest significance. Whereas
property owners (and some
courts) had generally considered
the economic impact of the contested regulation on the property
owner to be the key variable, the
Court for the first time in
Keystone elevated the "character
of the governmental action"
criterion to primary significance.
The Court pointed out that the
1966 Subsidence Act was
pred cated upon detailed
findings, and that the
islative purposes involved
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the environment, and
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United States, __ u.s.__, 106
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Senate
Government Committee
13, 1987 Sacramento CA
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Subject:
First Lutheran

Nol

Court's Decisions in
Limiting Local Governments

It is not my purpose to br
you a comprehensive review of the two
Court decisions on California land use practices. Your
witnesses earlier
had both that task and the credentials for
that assignment.
My purpose is to br
you some observations on how the decisions
might
t a few areas of land use which might not come readily to
First if those who say the decisions are "not going to have any
effect at all" are correct,
are correct in that the results of
the land use process may not
, but they are not correct in
suggest
the process to obtain those results will not change.
There will be more disc
the process, the record will be
better to support the
t, and, now that there are limits which
may expose the
c enti
to mone
damages, there should be
more concern about test
the line between a valid regulation and a
taking.
be much more

ffi

to initiate reformation of obsolete
property owners come forward with
situation which comes to mind is the
Act which requires maximizing
the
ivision. (1) However, in
ies there is to be no diminution of
of the tentative map is initially
a tentative map maximizing solar
opportunities and the map is
at less than the maximum
densities, has there been a
" of those lots deleted from the
no answer absent a lot of other facts, but
conflicting policies which justify the
Second, the land use process is a political process.
It has been
observed that "pressure from all sides
a politician
One source of
pressure comes from project
want the pro
t killed or, at worst, approved with
conditions in
the
icant will abandon the project.
be more difficult for elected officials to cater to that
pressure in the absence of
to deny the project or to
conditions unrelated to
the problems which would
In the
satisfy the opponents would,
ec
to a lawsuit and the
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Senate Local Government Committee
August 13, 1987
Court Decisions Effect on Land Use Regulations
invalidation of the unlawful action.
Now, to satisfy the opponents
the elective officials may be opening their city or county to a
taking claim during the time the unlawful action is in place.
This uncertainty as to the limits of denial or conditions may temper
the elected officials' response to project opponents.
It is the loss
of this "anything goes" attitude by project opponents which may be
the real reason for the outcry against these decisions by those who,
in the name of the "public interest", are, in reality, just against
the project.
Third, cities and counties may welcome pre-election challenges to
land use initiatives.
If a pre-election challenge invalidates
won t
taking claims from
affected during the time the initiative
successful pre-election challenge would

the initiative then they
those land owners adversely
would have been in effect. A
avoid those taking claims.

counties may find it more risky to blunt the effect of an
technique of putting on the ballot an alternative
tiative.
The risk, other than the ploy may not work, is
ternative to avoid potential taking issues while
ng its
itical attractiveness as an alternative to the
initiative.
Another reason a pre-election challenge might be welcome by a city or
is to avoid temporary taking claims between the passage of an
initiative and the repairs made to the land use policies affected by
the i
tiative. This could occur where the initiative is what I call
"the
ete general plan initiative." This is the initiative
makes a general plan change without regard to the plan as a
whole and thereby creates an internal inconsistency in the general
plan which is prohi ted by law. (2) During the time there is an
inconsistency in the general plan, certain land use decisions are
forbidden. (3) The initiative created the circumstances which puts a
temporary halt to land use actions, or a kind of moratorium. That
moratorium and implications of a temporary taking could be avoided by
a successful pre-election challenge to the incomplete general plan
initiative.
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Court Dec ions Effect on Land Use Regulations
Fourth, a most encouraging part of the Nollan decision is the signal
of another reversal(4) of California judicial doctrine -- that
development is a privilege, not a right.
This has given rise to the
notion that the conditions imposed in return for the development
approval are almost limitless.
This judicial doctrine no doubt is
the biggest contributor to the phrase the "vanishing fee" to describe
the loss of property owners' rights in the state.
This change in California law derives from footnote 2 in the Nollan
decision.
The pertinent part reads as follows:

But the right to build on one's own property-- even though
its exercise can be subjected to legitimate permitting
requirements -- cannot remo
y be described as a "government
benefit." And thus the announcement that the application for
(or granting of) the permit
11 entail the yielding of a
property interest cannot be regarded as establishing the
voluntary "exchange" that we found to have occurred in
Monsanto.
ly occurs
th footnote pronouncements in Supreme Court
, their significance shows up
a later opinion.
If this
ignored by those who want to retain the upper hand this
court-made doctrine has given them in the past, the landowners
U.S. Supreme Court
in a future case to establish
in state decis
1) Government Code Section 66473.1
(2) Government Code Section 65300.5
3) Government Code Sections 65860 and 66474 (a)
(4) First English Church changed the Agins remedy for an unlawful
land use regulation from invalidation to compensation for the time
the
ion was in effect.
Don V. Collin

-
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STATEMENT OF THE CALIFORNIA CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
BEFORE THE SENATE LOCAL GOVERNMENT COMMITTEE
CALIFORNIA STATE SENATE
"THE LIMITS CF LAND USE REGULATIONS"
THE HONORABLE MARIAN BERGESON, CHAIRMAN
August 13, 1987
Mr. Chairman:
My name is Christian W.H. Solinsky.
California Chamber of Commerce.

I am the Resources Director of the

The California Chamber is a voluntary business

organization with over 3,500 members, 160 trade associations and some 400
affiliated local chambers in California.
We appreciate this opportunity to comment on the two recent decisions of
the U.S. Supreme Court on property rights, Nollan v. California Coastal Commission
and First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles.
My comments will just address the legislative repercussions of the First English
Church case which reversed a decision of the California Supreme Court of Agins v.
City of Tiburon, 24 Cal 3rd 266 (1979).

The Agins decision had for all practical

purposes eliminated the use of "inverse condemnation" for legal claims that a
land use regulation was excessive and deprived the property owner of any
economic use of the land.

~easonable

The California Supreme Court ruled the agreived property

owner must first file an action to invalidate the ordinance and compensation was
not available for the inability to use the property while the regulation was in
effect.
The U.S. Supreme Court in First English Church decided the "just compensation"
clause of the Fifth Amendment allows the landowner to claim the property has in
effect been taken by excessive land use regulation and allows the property owner

Lu receive compensation for this "inverse condemnation" even if the taking is for
a short period of time, such as interim or temporary ordinances or until the

Presented by C.W.H. Solinsky, Resources Director of the California Chamber of
Commerce in Sacramento, CA on August 13, 1987.
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ordinance is invalidated.

The California Chamber of Commerce for a number of years since the Agins
decision and its

cases in

California Court system has supported

cause of action as a remedy for excessive land use regulatory policies of
government.

In the last session of the Legislature, Senator John Seymour

introduced SB 1833 and the Senate
"key" issue in the bill:

Committee identified the following

SHOULD PROPERTY OWNERS BE ENTITLED BY STATUTE TO

INTERIM DAMAGES fOR THE EXERCISE Of A REGULATING POWER BY A PUBLIC ENTITY WHICH
IS OCTERMINEO TO BE A "TAKING?"

Even though representatives of the League of

California Cities and other governmental agencies were involved in extensive
negotiations on the bill, it did not pass the Legislature.

All parties recognise

that the Agins decision was not satisfactory to the extent that parties with an
excessive land use regulation claim were excluded from using the Calfornia Court
System to obtain compensation.
What First

ly

"key" question in the

is an affirmative answer to that
Analysis -- that property owners will

be entitled to compensation for excessive regulations even if they are temporary
in nature.

We submit that all levels of government in California need a method

to process compensation claims at the
the methods to carry out the First

expense to the taxpayers.

One of

ish Church decision and to possibly limit

--------~-----------

the liability of

for compensation for excessive land use regulation

is to allow property owners to protest the excessive regulation but proceed with
construction of their project during the time when the court is asked to
adjudicate the protest of whether the

ation is excessive or not.

For several years now the California Chamber has supported and sponsored
legislation to allow landowners to

excessive land use exactions and

- 113 development fees and go forward with construction of the project while the
protest is litigated.
The Legislature has enacted at least three statutes allowing a protest of
excessive exactions imposed by local agencies (See Government Code Sections
65913.5, 65958, and 66475.4).

This year Assembly Member Elihu Harris introduced

AB 1915 which proposes that the protest procedure for excessive exactions and
development fees be extended to state agencies that issue land use permits.
When the bill was introduced at the request of the Chamber the purpose was to
allow the landowner to put the property into productive use and set aside for
later court resolution any dispute over the amount of land, money, or other
exactions that must be given to the government as a condition for obtaining
the building permit.
The bill has been structured in a way that guarantees the government agency
will receive the benefit of every exaction condition if and when the protest
unsuccessful.

The government may actually receive a performance bond or

L Lle lo lhe land in

mcnt may also make fi

ion before the protest process can be used.

The govern-

that the exaction conditions are so necessary for the

c health, safety or welfare that the entire protest procedure can be set

aside and the approval of the building permit suspended pending resolution of
the protested condition.
Since the First English Church decision we believe state agencies should
support the proposed protest procedure in AB 1915 as a method of reducing the
state's liabil

to landowners for excessive regulation claims.

AB 1915 will

be heard in Senate Natural Resources and Wildlife Committee next Monday, August 17,
1987.

The reason AB 1915 will reduce the liability of governments for inverse

condemnation is the property owner will be making some productive use of the

- 114 land during the lit
excessive.
cc~~omic

ion over whether or not the exaction condition is

In most situations the

d allow sufficient

use of the land to make the First

ish Church compensation

--------~-----------

standards inapplicable.
One other point we would like to make in closing is it might be useful
for your committee to review the statutes for protesting local government
Px8rtions to make sure the

ation which was passed in recent years is

adequate in light of _F_i_r_s_t__~~i_s_h__C_h_u_r_c_h.
We thank you for allowing us to testify today and I would be happy to
answer any questions.
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Report to the Senate Local Government Committee
SUBJECT:

Impact of U.S. Supreme Court Decision in First English and
Nollan

Presented by Brent Harrington on behalf of the California County
Planning Directors Association
Presented August

~3,

1987

Good afternoon
My name is Brent Harrington. I'm currently Planning Director for
Calaveras County, but today I am representing the California County
Planning Directors Association. Our Association, which represents the
58 County Planning Directors of California is vitally interested
in the impact of the U.S. Supreme Court's recent decisions regarding
the First English and Nollan cases. We met as an organization last
month to discuss the implications of these two cases, and our organization's response to them. After considerable deliberation, we would
like to
our comments at this time.
Our purpose in speaking today is to give a general overview of the
cases and how they affect decisions that we are involved with on a
daily basis. Our purpose is neither to recite chapter and verse of
the cases nor to restate the facts of the cases. We leave that
ana
to the many other speakers we're certain you'll hear today.
Instead
d
to discuss the reaction to the cases and how that
Plans and the land use decision making
level.
Planning Directors Association summarizes its
points, as follows:
1

while any Supreme Court decision regarding
, the two recent cases will not generate the
in land use planning that some would have us
cases
not create fundamental changes in
has been practiced in all counties. In partisaid that to not allow any use of land is a
s concept has been long understood by land use
planners and was not a new revelation. Nollan may have greater
due to some of the unanswered questions that it
Court's conclusion that there must be a solid
reasoning between a land use problem and the
to correct the problem is commonly understood by
The ability of a jurisdiction to impose
on new development to mitigate needs and
by
development is unchanged. In sum, the
First English and Nollan cases are important, but do not
change the basic concepts of land use planning in California.

2.
made

is a significant need to educate all concerned parties
implications of these cases. There has been much
popular press about the implications of these deci-

16 -

sions.

of most newspapers and
Many early news
erroneous interpretations of the
some parties that these
the land use planning process.
have received
numerous
owners, developers, environmental groups and
associations asking or asserting what
these cases mean.
have
raised at public hearings,
and our respective Boards and Planning Commissions are searching
for answers. We are
cases themselves may not
be as important as
reaction they may
cause for apprehens
decision makers. Clearly, there is a
need to reach a we
conclusion on the implications of
these decisions,
ly disseminate that information to
all concerned
3.

We do expect
a
significantly
increased numbers
cases resulting from First English and
Nollan. Our
that most experienced land
use attorneys rea ze
two cases are not as significant
as some parties may want
lieve. Whi
we may not like it,
we do realize that more court
and expense will be needed
to better def
the
of First English and Nollan.
We do hope that
parties, good land use decisions
will be made, and
frivolous cases, which will cost
local government s
money to defend, will be
prevented.

4.

The

in
Zoning
mental
alters
those dec
supporting
English

confirm the need to ensure
1 and well reasoned
court was trying to
makers
we must carefully
implications. Sound
this
, with the need
public land use
national leader
as the General Plan and
California Environrecent Court decisions
tools. Yes, we must
our decisions, and
upon proper findings and sufficient
concepts were sound before First
11 be sound for a very long time.

our organization by stating
I want to end my comments on
that we appreciate
Local Government Committee's keen and swift
to speak to you. We
interest in these
look to you
point to address the points we
have named
to recommend that this Committee
publish its
from these deliberations, which
would great
process relative to these cases.
Our organi-z
participate in your delibera-
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tions and followup action, and we offer our services to you as you see
fit.
Are there any questions?

Submitted by Brent Harrington representing The California County Planning
Directors Association
CONTACT:

Brent Harrington
Calaveras County
Planning Department
891 Mountain Ranch Rd.
San Andreas, CA. 95249
(209) 754-3841
George Robson, President CCPDA
% Tehama County Planning Department
Courthouse Annex, Rm I
Red Bluff, CA. 96080
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Senator Marian Bergeson
Chairman and Members of
Senate Committee on Local Government
Room 2080
State Capitol
Sacramento, CA 95814
Re:

"The Limits of Land Use Regulation"
Hearing, August 13, 1987

Dear Senator Bergeson:
lf of the League of California Cities, I
to assist the Committee with understanding
these important land use decisions from the
of local government.
Attached hereto are responses to the specific
t
you have posed (tab 1), my paper on the three
major land use decisions decided by the Supreme Court this
term (
2), an outline for analyzing takings claims (tab
3),
my statement of qualifications (tab 4).
At this time there are some procedural areas where
legislation might be helpful in expeditiously resolving the
uncertainties caused by the Supreme Court's decisions in
and Nollan.
1.
Legislation clarifying that administrative and
traditional mandamus are the appropriate state forums for
resolving disputes over land use regulations in the first

NEWELL
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Marian Bergeson
Chairman and Members of
Senate Committee on
Local Government
August 13, 1987
Page 2

instance and that a timely action in mandate (or possibly
declaratory relief) is a prerequisite to an action for just
compensation.
2.
Administrative and court procedures to ensure
that the public agency defendant is able to insure early
resolution of the issues.
3.
Short statutes of limitations for just compensation claims.

Katherine E. Stone
Of Burke, Williams & Sorensen
KES/cdh
Encls.
cc:

Connie H. Barker
Peter Detweiler
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RESPONSES TO PREPARED QUESTIONS

QUESTION 1.

Early press reports characterized the First

Lutheran Church and Nollan decisions as signalling a major
change in land use law.

RESPONSE:

No.

Do you agree?

Neither First Lutheran Church nor Nollan

changed established land use rules.

The United States

Supreme Court reaffirmed these rules in another case this
term, Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. De
Benedictis.

In Keystone the Court upheld a regulation

almost identical to the one struck down sixty-five years ago
in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, where Chief Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes invoked a constitutional debate by
stating:

"If a regulation goes too far it will be

recognized as a taking."

The Court held just that in First

Lutheran, but did not decide what is "too far," when a
taking would start, or the measure of damages for a
temporary taking.

However, the Supreme Court's decision did

end the debate in the federal courts.

The result will be to

shift the cases back to the state courts to decide what
constitutes a taking under state law.

This will mean

changes in trial tactics.
In Nollan, the Court held that a land dedication
imposed as a condition of development must relate to the

Tab
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nt

s caus

s

how close the r

t

d

not decide

ip must be.

ti

In both Nol- - and First Lutheran the Court
reaffirmed prior cases inc
land use regu

tions

Agins v. Tiburon upholding

i

a wi

variety of purposes and

which, in some cases, severe

impact land values.

For a

more complete analysis of this question, see my paper
entitled, "Has the Supreme Court Cast an Instant Pall on
Land Use Controls?", which is attached under tab-2.

QUESTION

How will these cases change public officials'

~

practices?

RESPONSE:

As a practical matter, First Lutheran will

y

a

il i

effect on some public agencies'

land use practices.

Deve

damage suits

es

rsonal
e r r or s •

li
Sma 1

for

r attorneys may threaten large
ing officials may be

t

1 manner of land use planning

r cities with 1

from maki

use

budgets may shy away
isions.

Individual officials

fear personal monetary ruin.
a.

can 1 t they do now that they used to

r

No
have not

i

remedy.

The substantive rules
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b.

Will these cases slow down land use

decisions as public officials become more cautious about
lawsuits?
Response:

They could.

Especially as lawyers

inevitably become more involved in planning and planners
attempt to interpret and predict the law.
c.

Some suggest that local officials will be

more reluctant to amend general plans to designate more land
for development until it is clear that the project is ready
to begin.

They fear that early planning will give rise to

later taking questions.
Response:

Do you agree?
This effect on local officials is

an unfortunate possibility.

Although California law is now

clear that early planning does not give rise to a property
right which can be "taken", this "vested rights" rule is
strongly criticized by developers and could be changed by
the new State Supreme Court.

Some city planners are

considering avoiding up-zoning property for development and
instead generally indicating that the area may be designated
for development in the future.

As a matter of good planning

procedures it is preferable that land use policies be
established early in the process.
d.

Will officials change their practices

regarding access to navigable waterways, particularly in the
Delta, at Lake Tahoe, and along the coast?

- 124 -

public officials may do
so, the Nollan decision on access should be pretty much
limited to its facts--the impacts of replacement of a small
single family home with a larger home.

The impacts of

larger developments of unimproved lands bordering navigable
waterways on access to such public trust lands should not be
difficult to show.

QUESTION l.!_

California's 80 charter cities have

constitutional authority over their "municipal affairs."
Will either of these cases affect charter cities differently
than they affect counties

RESPONSE:

No.

ral law cities?

The cases involve limits imposed by the

United States Constitution,

i

applies equally to both

charter and general law cities and counties.

It is

important, however, to note that not every planning error
will rise to a c

under the constitution.

occasioned by v

Delays

ing requirements imposed by

statute (e.g.,

ral plan consistency} would not amount to

a taking under the Fifth Amendment.

QUESTION 4.

In First Lutheran Church, Chief Justice

Rehnquist said that the Court was not deciding "whether the
county might avoid

cone

sion that a compensable taking
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had occurred by establishing that the denial of all use was
insulated as a part of the State's authority to enact safety
regulations."

California law often justifies regulations in

the name of public health, safety, and welfare but Rehnquist
only mentioned "safety."

Does this suggest that health or

welfare consicerations may not be sufficient to justify
regulations that deny all use of property?

Is public safety

the only acceptable justification?

RESPONSE:

Justice Rehnquist may have only referred to

"safety" regulations because the facts of First Lutheran
give rise to safety concerns (a fire and flood with the loss
of 10 lives}.

Certainly public safety can justify severe

land use regulations.

However, the cases cited by Justice

Rehnquist for this point were not limited to public safety
justification, but instead, involved nuisance-like
ac ivities and an analysis similar to Justice Stevens'
nion in Keystone.

ION 5.
p

Government Code §65858 sets out the

res that counties and most cities must follow when
ing temporary zoning moratoria.

The Legislature

the current section in 1982 and it will "sunset
January 1, 1989 unless reauthorized.
the section will then apply.

11

on

The earlier version of

26 -

a.
of t

rary r

Does the cur ent language avoid the kind
latory t

discussed in First Lutheran

i

Church?
Response:

I

ink so.

suggest some precautionary

More analysis may

ts.

Temporary zoning

moratoria should not give rise to a taking claim in any
event because they do not purport to deprive a landowner of
all use for a
ordinari

tantial

wou

of time and because a claim

r

not become ripe under Williamson County

Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 450 U.S. 172
(1985) within the moratorium period.

he

b.

islature renew the current

language?

c.
the

is

ture r

rvisors to
wel

re

Are

I

ink so.

rt

r

ire cit
tter

itions

Should

councils and county boards of

fine
t

nts needed?

ic health, safety, or
moratorium is meant to resolve?
nexus required by Nollan

is not

tantially different from that which local

governments are accustomed.
these findings
are

1

The substance and nature of

be left to the local governments which

r wi

necessitating the moratorium.

the circumstances

other

d

statutes to conform

ich ones?
to fully

e

re

ION 6.
Courts tr i i
=-----set
elected l is tures.
ordinances, or local initiat

t

policies

es, local
ic health,

safety, or welfare problems
tions,
F rst Lut

t infl

ll

on detail
's actions
reat to t
er

one the Court

-~~~-~;;...__.;:..

is

l

rred to the

o arr

common

ived to be a
five years

ix

1

in
i

ts will apply

ran Chur

It WOU
r

new

r

rt held that
leal 1

islat

justificat on.
local

evel

at both the
e

regulation is des
fare
cited with
rst Lutheran,

t public

nee courts
ic health,
Agins v.
in both Nollan
on

eems to scrutinize land use
r

ions more c

It is usually easier to explain

and justify legislation that recites the reasons why it was
enacted.
a.

statutory findings

11 landowners pay more attention to
declarations of legislative intent?
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Response:
b.

I don't know.

Will local officials ask the Legislature

to strengthen the statements of legislative intent in
statutes that permit local regulations?
Response:
c.

Perhaps.

Will drafters of local initiatives and

referenda strengthen their statements of intent to immunize
them from possible legal challenges?
Response:

Findings are not required in

initiatives even where otherwise required by statute.
v. Camarillo (1986) 41 Cal.3d 810.)

(BIA

Statements of intent

are helpful to show what information was before the
electorate.

Proponents of initiatives may lack the

sophistication to draft detailed findings and City Councils
cannot change an initiative before putting it on the
ballot.

The Supreme Court in BIA v. Camarillo had

difficulty with the concept of findings being made before
the measure had been submitted to the electorate.

QUESTION

~

Under First Lutheran Church, when does a

temporary regulatory taking start?

RESPONSE:

Justice Rehnquist did not say, but stated:
"We do not deal with the quite different
questions that would arise in the case of

30 -

a n

ordinances a

z

the li e,
Just a

city must

are not before use.

Prev ously,

ttedly serious problems."

n

Hamilton

Court

t even an eight-year

t

ication process did not present a "ripe" taki
taki

Before a r
must r

11

a reasonable opportunity to

all

with sol tions to

t

variances

ist writing for the majority

Inc., Justice

II

ts

, in

r

--------~------

stat

ldi

y

issue

d

presented

claim.
land owner

e a "meaning

r a

1

lication."
t

rt

i

r

r

t

a
ish

s

r to seek a variance before

ir

twee

How can

rs and

lie officials
nd

norma

tory taki

ocess

t

s?

itself doesn't lead to
taki
taki

If a

unit
a

r

de

wit

some reasonable use (e.g., 1

5 acres

~~--------------

s while

compensable.
use

ion of all use that is the

it

If the r

)) then there is no taking

r seeks a higher use are not

tion denies the landowner all

t justification, then the taking would appear to
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start when the regulation is "applied" to the land.

In

First Lutheran the court indicated that a permanent
deprivation of all use might be justified for safety
reasons.

A temporary deprivation for welfare reasons, such

as general plan revisions would also be justified.

In any

event, the landowner would normally be required to seek
administrative relief before the claim would be ripe or
considered "applied."
b.

Is state legislation needed to define

when a temporary regulatory taking starts?

Or should this

issue be left to the courts to interpret?
Response:

Legislation is not needed.

The

courts will decide the constitutional issue in any event.
c.

Is state legislation needed to guide the

courts in how to calculate a landowner's loss which occurs
during a temporary regulatory taking?
Response:

No.

The loss protected by the

constitution is a judicial determination which cannot be
limited by legislation.

It is important to distinguish

temporary takings of all use from permanent takings and
temporary takings which affect title, physical integrity or
some other vested interest.

Eminent domain law is not

necessarily relevant to valuation of temporary takings by
overregulation because a landowner generally does not have a
vested right or reasonable expectation in a particular use.
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QUESTION 2..:_

If a state regulation is found to be a

temporary regulatory taking, what is the State General
Fund's exposure?

RESPONSE:

It may be exposed.
a.

If a local regulation, adopted to

implement state law, is found to be a temporary regulatory
taking, what is the State General Fund's exposure?
Response:

Under the state constitution as

interpreted in the County of Los Angeles case, the State is
required to provide reimbursement if the State imposes a
mandate which applies uniquely to local government.
Therefore if a local government is directly or indirectly
required to adopt a regulation which is found to constitute
a taking.

The State must fully reimburse the local

government.
b.

What is the process for recovering

damages?
Response:

The State should be a necessary

party to suits involving state mandated programs.

QUESTION 10.

Will Nollan influence the current debate over

charging fees for off-site improvements?
what about school developer fees?

In particular,
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RESPONSE:

Nollan may require a higher scrutiny in local

dedication situations; this same scrutiny would not seem to
apply to development fees.

The nexus required by Nollan

does not seem to be more stringent than the familiar
Associated Homebuilders v. Walnut Creek test.

-

QUESTION 11.

The traditional test of levying benefit

assessments is that landowners must pay in proportion to the
benefit conferred on their property by the facility or

-

service being financed.
a.

Is the "nexus'' discussed in Nollan any

different?
Response:

The nexus discussed in Nollan is

less direct than that required of benefit assessments.
Nollan says the exaction must relate to the same impacts
caused in the development; i.e., if the development will
cause more traffic, an off-site road widening condition may
be appropriate, but not off-site low income housing.

Under

Nollan the exaction need not be related to any special
benefit conferred or proportionally related to the impact.
b.

What can landowners and land use

regulators learn from assessment practices that will help
them find this nexus?
Response:

The type of engineering analysis

used for benefit assessments is a conservative way to
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analyze
measures.

t

impacts

appropriate mitigation
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HAS THE
PALL ON

AN INSTANT
CONTROLS?

By Katherine E. Stone

THE SUPREME COURT'S RECENT DECISIONS
SHOULD NOT INHIBIT REASONABLE LAND USE
REGULATION.
The editors of the Los Angeles Times characterized
the Supreme Court's decision in First English Evangell7al
Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles ("First Lutheran Church") that the constitution requires
just compensation for overregulation, as casting an "instant
pall on state and local land use controls at a time when
such controls are critical to ts~ orderly development and
protection of the environment."-/ The Times editorial
worries that planning
ncies may be paralyzed by fear of
facing huge monetar j
nts and suggests that the
validity of routine
regulations may be put in doubt
b¥ the Sup~e~e C~qrt's
Other newspapers echoed the
T1mes pess1m1sm.-/
Deve
rs' attor
j~bilantly pronounced Nollan
v. California Coastal Commission-/ the death knell to the
ogram and predicted an end to
permits.
In contrast to these two well publicized opinions,
by the Supreme Court this term
In Ke~~tone Bituminous Coal
ctis,=f ("Keystone Coal") the court
--:---::-...-------::---:-..,.------,::----:---.i ca 1 to the one s t ruck down
in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon§/,
where Chief Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. invoked a
constitutional
te
stating "If regulation goes too far
it will be recognized as a taking".
a thi

i
te
tted the reserved power
of state and
l
rnment
exercise the police power
for health, safety and welfare-/ against the just
compensation c
e
fif
amendment to the United
States Constitution. For the
t sixty-five years
government lawyers have arg
that a sufficient remedy for

7q
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a land use regulation that goes too far is invalidation of
the regulation under the due process clause of the
Constitution. First Lutheran Church has settled that
debate. Developer and landowner attorneys have now
persuaded a majority of the court that just compensation is
required by the fifth amendment for even a temporary taking.
While the constitutional debate has ended, the high
court's opinions this term do not in any way suggest that
reasonable land use regulations will subject local
government to damages or that government should refrain from
conditioning development on the provision of land
dedications, impact fees, and other exactions.
On the contrary, government may still proh~bit
citizens from raising livestock in their backyards,_/
prohib~t citi~ens from.running ?u~iness7s in residential
areas,_/ requ1re exact1ons to m1t1gate 1mpacts of
development and put a temporary hold on dey lopment. The
court's prior decision in Agins v. Tiburon--/ limiting a
developer to one house for every one, two or five acres was
not overruled, but affirmed in First Lutheran Churi~/and
Nollan. Government may still prohibit at~;use of, __ or
even destroy property that is dangerous.-But if a
regulation denies a landowner all use of his or her property
without valid justification, or if a dedication condition is
not reasonably related to the impacts caused by the
development, the government may be required to pay
compensation.

0

The Ruling In First Lutheran Church Is No Big
Surprise.
It is not surprising that the United States Supreme
Court ~~& ruled that the fifth amendment just compensation
clause--/ of the United States Constitution obligates the
payment of interim damages if a government regulation
amounts to a temporary
ing of
rty. Before 1971
when the California Supreme Court in Agins v. Tiburon _!;
held that "inverse condemnation is an inappropriate and
undesirable remedy in cases in which unconstitutional
regulation is alleged," most government lawyers assumed
damages might be awarded in a proper case. Since at least
1981, when five justices
the United State! Supreme Court
in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego-2/ indicated
compensation might be constitutionally required and Justice
Brennan stated "(a]fter all, if a poli£gman must know the
Constitution then why not a planner?,"-/ we have been
expecting a ruling to that effect from the high court. 1 7/
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t is su risi
is t
vehicle the court chose
to make its pronouncement--a case where the regulation
appears to be clear
justified on its face.
In First
Lutheran Church,
ief
tice Rehnquist, joined by Justices
Brennan, White, Marshall, Powell and Scalia, reached the
remedy without fi i
a
r
· The Court expressly did not
decide whether Los Angeles County's interim flood ordinance
(enacted as an urgency measure after a fire and flash flood
destroyed a camp for
i
children) actually denied
the church "all use of its property or whether the county
might avoid the cone
ion that a compensable taking had
occurred by establishing that the denial of all use was
insulated as a gart of the State's authority to enact safety
regulations. 11 ~7 As stated by Justice Stevens, dissenting:
"[I]t is imperative to stress that the
court does not ho
that appellant is
entitled to compensation as a result of
the flood protection regulation that the
county enacted
No matter whether the
regulation is treated as one that
deprives appellant of its property on a
permanent or t
rary basis, the court's
precedents demonstrate the type of
regulatory
ram at ~qsue here cannot
constitute a taki
. !_;

Lu

The issue deci
the Supreme Court in First
ran Church is very narrow:
"Where the government's activities have
alr
wor
a taki
of all use of
property, no
equent action by the
government can relieve it of the duty to
prov
t
for the period
during
ich
ing was effective.".
(Emphasis added).

It is apparent that Chief Justice Rehnquist was
frustrated with the Court's repeated failure to reach the
taking question. Four t
in the last six years, after
assuming jurisdict
, t
Court ruled that either the
regulat~£n did not constitute a taking, as in Agins v.
Tiburon--/, or that
l disputes might still lead to the
conclusion that no
ing
o~~urred, as in MacDonald,
Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County,_·_ Williamson County Regional
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Planning Comm'n. v. Hamilt~~,Bank~/ and San Diego Gas &
Electric Co. v. San Diego.--/
This term the Court accepted three cases where a
taking was claimed: First Lutheran Church, Nollan and
Keystone Coal. As none of the cases presented facts
sufficient to actually constitute a compensable taking, the
Chief Justice had to decide 5he remedy in a vacuum, or
2
"leave it for another day."-/
Curiously, the Court selected from the three
potential taking cases before it this term the case which
most observers viewed as the least likely to constitute a
taking. First Lutheran Church involved a challenge to Los
Angeles County's interim flood ordinance adopted as an
urgency measure after a devastating flood destroyed lives
and property, including a retreat and a camp for handicapped
children owned by the First Lutheran Church. The camp was
situated along Mill Creek, a natural drainage channel in Los
Angeles County. Only the low lying portion of the Church's
property was affected by the ordinance.
The majority of the Court in First Lutheran Church
limited its discussion and its holding to the remedy
available if a temporary taking is found. The Court
specifically did not address whether the ordinance in
question actually effected a taking. Nor did it alter the
tests generally employed by the Court for determining
whether a taking has occurred.
Chief Justice Rehnquist emphasized that for
purposes of his opinion only, the court assumed that the
moratorium had deprived the church
all use of its
property for a considerable period of time. He also
emphasized that even if this were true, compensation would
not be r2~4ired if the regulation was justified for safety
reasons.--/ As examples of such justification, the Chief
Justice referred to cases upholding the exercise of the
police power prohibiting ex~'Jations below two feet above
maximum ground water level~ 07 bri
yards in certain
81
areas-~and a distillery.~!
Justice Rehnquist repeatedly emphasized his
assumption that the church was deprived of all use of its
property, and did not suggest that something less would
amount to a taking. Significantly, the court stated that
the regulation in Agins, where property was dow~~qned to 1-5
units per five acres "did not effect a taking."-/
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S nee at east 1926 y~en the Supreme Court decided
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,l-1 it has been established that
(l) a regulatory pr ram does not constitute a taking unless
it destroys all reasonable use of the property; (2) state
law defines property rights; and (3) government may, in a
proper exercise of its police power, substantially interfere
with even vested property rights to prevent harm. The
Court's decision in
rst Lutheran Church does not change
these established land use rules.
The Nollan Case Did Not Significantly Alter
Land Uses Rules
In Nollan, a 5-4 decision authored by Justice
Scalia, joined by Rehnquist, White, Powell and O'Connor, the
Court held invalid as applied to the Nollan's property the
Coastal Commission's requirement that a permit to build a
conditioned on providing public
new beachfront house
access along that beach. Although the Court stated that in
this circumstance, if the State wanted to provide for public
access it would have to pay for it, there was no taking
because the Nollans had built their house without complying
with the condition.
The Court
rved
t conditioning development on
dedication of land is constitutional if the condition is
designed to serve the same purposes for which the Commission
could deny
permit,
t ruled:
"The evident const tutional propriety
disappears, however, if the condition
substituted
t
prohibition utterly
fails to fur
r the end advanced as the
justification for
prohibition."E/
The Court r
iz
that the Commission's goal to
ensure adequate
lie access to the public tidelands was
valid, but
t there was an insufficient "nexus"
between this
e
t
condition imoosed.
In other
words, the Commission did not show that the new house would
burden public access to
beach.
Nor did the evidence
show that the dedicat
condition would relieve the impacts
the Commission advanced as justification for the
condition. The Court did say, however, that assuming the
Commission could have exercised its police power to deny the
permit because of
s caused by the development, alone
or in conjunction with other similar developments,
conditions re
to those impacts such as height
limitations, width restrictions, a ban on fences, or even
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requiring a "viewing spot" on the ~~llan's property for
passersby would be constitutional.--/
Like the decision in First Lutheran Church, the
Court's holding in Nollan is narrow and reaffirmed traditional land use rules. The majority cited to the downzoning
in Agins v. Tiburon as an example of a valid land use regulation, as it had in First Lutheran Church.
The practical effect of the Nollan decision is to
require state and local governments to make clear findings
that link conditions requiring dedications and other exactions to the burdens caused by the development.
The Court Reaffirmed Government Power
To Control Land Use In Keystone Coal

-

State and local governments' power to enact and
enforce reasonable land use regulations without liability
for damages was reaffirmed earlier this term in Keystone
Coal. The case arose out of a challenge to a Pennsylvania
statute which requires coal mine operators to leave a certain amount of coal in the ground to prevent land subsidence. The Pennsylvania State Legislature based its decision
to implement the support requirement on detailed findings
that the legislation was important for the protection of
public health and safety, preservation of ~ffected municipalities' tax bases and land development.l-1
~~~ty-five years ago, in Pennsylvania Coal Company
v. Mahon, __ / the Supreme Court held that a similar
regulation was not properly justified. This time, however,
in an opinion written by Justice Stevens a majority of the
Court held that the regulation was a valid exercise of the
police power and not a taking of property within the meaning
of the fifth amendment taking clause. The Court held that
the mine operators had not sustained their heavy burden of
showing that the statute on its face effects a taking. The
Court emphasized that the record showed that (1) the state
had acted to arrest what it perceived to be a significant
threat to the common welfare; and (2) the statute did not
make it impossible for the mine operators to profitably
engage in their business or unduly interfere with the
operator's investment-backed expectations.

The Court further held that the coal left in the
ground is not a separate segment of property for purposes of
the taking clause, and that the requirement tha~ the coal be
left in place did not effect a physical taking.~/
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THE CASES

INHIBIT REASONABLE LAND USE REGULATION

Although as a practical matter the First Lutheran
Church and the Nollan cases may temporarily have a chilling
effect on local land use planning, the Supreme Court's
opinions this term
not in any way suggest that reasonable
land use regulations will subject local government to
damages. This is evide
by the Keystone Coal decision,
which applied the tradit
1 taking analysis and upheld the
Pennsylvania statute, and the Nollan decision where the
Court stated:
"Our cases have not elaborated on the
standards
r determining what constitutes a '
itimate state interest' or
what type of connection between the regulation and the state interest satisfies
the requirement that the former 'substantially advance' the latter. They
have made clear, however, that a broad
range of governmental purposes and regulations Sqtisfies these requirements. u1JJ
The Court then cited as examples of valid ~~nd use
regulatio~s ~~~es uphol<;Iing ~cenic ~oni28;3 I, landmark
preservatlon--1 and resl
tlal zonlng.-Thus, although the Court's three "taking" decisions
this term may result in closer judicial scrutiny of land use
regulations, local government may continue to enact
moratoriums, rezone property, prohibit development in
setback areas and greenbelts, control growth, preserve
historical landmarks, prevent noxious uses of property and
require land dedications and other exactions to mitigate the
impacts of development, so long as the regulation does not
amount to a compensable "taking" under the traditional
taking analysis.
QUESTIONS LEFT UNANSWERED BY THE COURTS DECISIONS
What Is A Taking?
This term the Supreme Court did not add any new
insights on what
constitute a taking. The Court has
often stated that there are no hard and fast rules for
determining when a taking has occurred, and that such a
decision must be made on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis.4 1 /
In PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins-4 -2 / , the Court stated:

-
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"It is well established that not every
destruction or injury to property by
governmental action has been held to be a
taking in the constitutional sense.
Rather, the determination whether state
law unlawfully infringes on a landowner's
property in violation of the taking
clause requires an examination of whether
the restriction on private property
forces some people alone to bear public
burdens which, in all fairness and
justice, should be borne by the public as
a whole."
In Nollan, the majority relied on the Court's
opinion in Agins v. Tiburon as expressing the test for a
taking as follows:
"A land use regulation does not effect a
taking if it 'substantially advance[s]
legitimate state interests' and does not
'den[y] an owner economically viable use
of his land', Agigj ,v. Tiburon, 447 U.S.
2 5 5 , 2 6 0 ( 19 8 0 ) • "_I

In analyzing a taking claim the Court has traditionally focused on two primary factors. The first is the
character of the state action. As a rule, it is more difficult to establi
a taking when the interference with property is characteriz~i as regulatory as opposed to actual
physical occupation--1 , and harder still when the
interference is necessary
r th~ gromotion of the health
and safety of the general public~7. The more substantial
the public interest, the less likely it is that a taking
will be found. Local entities have broad discretion to
eliminate noxious uses of property, or uses which constitute
a public nuisance, even if the exercise of such discretion
substantially ~nterferes with an individual's use of his or
her property.!_/ In First Lutheran Church, the Court
recognized that even all use might be prohibited in a flood
zone for safety reasons.
The second primary factor is the i~~qct of the
regulation on protected property interests.--/ In Keystone
Coal, the Court noted that the statute did not make it
impossible to engage in the coal mining business or unduly
interfere with investment-backed expectations. When
analyzing these kinds of factors it is important to remember
that property interests are ~ reated and defined by state
laws, not the Constitution.±-7
.
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Any "taki " anal is should start with the
questions: (1) what alleg
property interest has been
"taken"; and (2) is it a protected interest under California
law? For example, in
lifornia development is a privilege,
not a right, and a developer cannot have a reasonable
investment-backed expectation (a protected property
interest) in a garticular development until he has gained a
vested right.~7
The right to develop a particular project generally
does not vest until there has been substantial detriment in
good fa~ n reliance on a validly issued building
0 There is no right t~ q higher or even to the
permit.--/
existing zoning classification._!/
It is not until a
protected property right has been "taken" that the question
of compensation arises, and before a landowner can claim a
denial of ~11 use he must apply for a "reasonable use" of
the land.~/ These well-established rules have not been
affected by the Court's decision in First Lutheran Church or
Nollan, and are reaffirmed in Keystone Coal. It is
important to be aware, however, that ~~ghts may vest earlier
pur~~qnt to a development agreement,~/ a vesting tentative
map-s~;or automatic approval under the Permit Streamlining
Act.If A Taking Has Occurred, When Did It
Start?
In First
rch, Justice Rehnquist assumed
that the county's
had denied the church of all
use of its property from the outset for a substantial period
of time, and included litigation delays in the calculation.
This is disturbing because litigation delays can be
substantial, and such delays are often beyond the control of
defendant government agencies.
The
inion did not explain when such delays might
become a taking, but stated:
"We . . • do not
1 with the quite
different questions that would arise in
the case of normal delays in obtaining
building permits, changes in zoning
ordinances, varianc5~ and the like, which
are not before us. 11 - 1

-
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Just a 7~ar ago, in City of Renton v. Playtime
Theatres, Inc.,2-l Justice Rehnquist writing for the
majority stated "the city must be allowed a reasonable
opportunity to experiment with solutions to admittedly
serious problems." Previously, in William~~? County
Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank,:= the Court held
that even an eight-year application process did not present
a "ripe" taking claim. Before a ripe taking issue could be
presented the land owner must reapply for a development
permit and make a "meaningful a~ilication." In MacDonald,
Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County,_/ the Court required the
developer to seek a variance before considering the taking
claim.
These cases show that what constitutes a
substantial period of time in the view of the Supreme Court
needs clarification.
What Is Just Compensation?

-

-

The Court only briefly discussed the question of
the measure of damages for regulatory takings in First
Lutheran Church. In its discussion, the Court relied on
phys~cal taking cases arising out of the government's temporary appropriation of private property during World War
II. The Court noted that in these cases, the measure of
damages was based on the value of the use of the land during
the period of time the land was used by the government.
"'It is the owner's loss, not the taker's gaig which is the
measure of the value of the property taken.'"-61
Questions remain as to the standard for measuring
the owner's loss, e.g., is it the minimum constitutional
use? Other issues such as the owner's duty to mitigate,
offsets for increases in value and many other wellrecognized rules for valuing property damage remain to be
litigated.
What Nexus Is Constitutionally Required
For Development Conditions?
The dedication condition in Nollan was held invalid
because the ma~£ rity felt it "utterly fails to further the
end advanced."- 7 But the Court did not clarify what type
of connection is constitutionally required. It has always
been the rule in California and elsewhere that there must be
a reasonable relationship between the development impacts
and exactions.

48 -

direct connection
created

llan argued that there must be a
ition and the burdens
Since Associated
nut Creek, 3 California courts have held
rec nexus s required. The Coastal
. ior ~~ Nollan have all relied on this
6
t:est.-

~~----~----~~~--~--------

"indirect nexus 11

Although
Court characterized the California
rule as the
nori
position, it did not accept the plaintiff's proffered direct nexus test.
Instead the majority
us
the terms "substantially advancing a legitimate ~~a,te
interest" and "serves the same governmental purpose."-/
The majority also r
iz
t the cumulative impacts of
s
~ar d~vel
. ~s co~~~ be a legitimate government basis
for 1mpos1ng exact:lons.-Justice Brennan, dissenting, interpreted the
standard articu t
by the majority to be the familiar rule
that there must
a "reasonable relationship" between the
ts of the
t and the condition imposed.
After
erne Court's decision in Nollan, it is
somewhat uncertain
ecisely what sort of nexus will pass
constitutional muster. As a practical matter, this is generally not a
se statutes such as Government
Code Section
a close nexus for monetary exactions
of development approval. Exact
impos
ivision Map Act also require a
fairly close nexus. More exotic conditions are generally
only imposed on larger developments as a result of negotiations.
CONCLUSION
States
reme Court has held
tion
ired for a regulatory taking in
certain circumstances,
lower federal courts and the
Cali r
court
sel
found that a local land use
regulation on its
or as applied constitutes a taking,
and to date no
llate court has awarded compensation for
over-r
lation o
t
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August 13, 1987

When Has City Regulatory Action Gone Too Far:
What Is A Taking?

Peter M. Thorson
Benjamin Kaufman
Margaret A. Sohagi

A land use regulation is not a taking if:
1.

The regulation substantially advances a
legitimate governmental interest;
and

2.

The regulation does not deny claimant
economically viable use of his land.
(Nollan v. California Coastal
Comm1ssion, No. 86-133, slip
opin1on at page 8 (June 26,
1987); Keystone Bituminous
Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis,
480 U.S.
,
, 94 L.Ed.2d
472, 488 (1987~Agins v.
Tiburon, 447 u.s. 255, 260
(1980).)
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When Has City Regulatory
Action Gone Too Far:
What Is A Taking?

1.

Does the regulation substantially advance a
legitimate governmental interest?
{a)

What is the identified governmental interest
behind the regulation?

(b)

How important is the identified state
interest:
Is it health and safety related, or
just related to the general welfare? For
permits, is the identified governmental purpose
sufficient to justify denial of the application?

(c)

Does the project or the activity sought to be
regulated impose a burden on the identified
governmental interest?
(i)

Direct

(ii)

Indirect/cumulative

(d)

Does the regulation alleviate the burden imposed
on the identified state interest?

(e)

To what extent does the regulation single out
the project to bear a disproportionate share of
the burden?
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When Has City Regulatory
Action Gone Too Far:
What Is A Taking?

2.

Does the regulation deny claimant economically viable
use of his land?

Looking at the specific facts on a case by case basis,
consider the following factors:

-

(a}

Economic impact of the regulation
Bundle of sticks remaining
Parcel as a whole

(b)

Interference with reasonable investment-backed
expectations
- No reasonable expectation of a zoning
classification unless a vested right.

(c)

Character of the governmental action.
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You have asked me to present my views on how the

1/
recent First Lutheran- and Noll
ion and, particular

regu

, the

reg

ators oug

Supreme Court's

decisions will affect land use
atory program of the San Francisco Bay

Commission.

Conse vation and

u.s.

I

believe the committee and land use

31
d 10
,
,
a 1 so to b e as 1ntereste
Keystone Coa 1- , t h e much 1 ess

discussed case that was also decided this term so I will also refer to the
essons that case has to teach us as we 1.
bri

ed
,

these cases
t

The efore

the Attorney General's staff and has discussed the

Commission has not
the comments

Although the Commission has been

I

am

any formal position on this matter.
ing today are mine and do not necessarily

reflect our Commission's views.

S. Ct. 1232 (1987)
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In a nutshell I think First Lutheran and Nollan will impact most
Californians because their local governments will be less able and willing to
address the many and serious problems that beset our rapidly growing state.
Smaller local governments will be particularly affected because they may not
have either the legal or planning resources to take risks in the land use mine
field that the Court has laid in these two cases.

On the other hand the three

cases taken together reaffirm the Fifth Amendment •taking• rules first
established in 1922 by Justice Holmes.
governmental action is a •taking•.

They do not help us identify what

Larger agencies will be able to better

cope with the increased risk; they will also be better equipped to analyze the
burdens of projects on the general public.
First Lutheran sets aside the California rule that improper regulations
should be invalidated rather than money damages awarded.

So if a city or

county faces a difficult problem of public health, safety or welfare and
devises land use regulations to address the problem, it risks second guessing
by the United States Supreme Court and, if its regulations are found wanting,
payment of money damages.

Now if we knew what governmental regulations went

too far this remedy would not make a lot of difference since most agencies are
only interested in solving society's problems in a legally sound manner.
even Justice Holmes could not inform us when a regulation goes too far.
said •[T]his is a question of degree
. .

But
He

and therefore cannot be disposed of by

4/

genera 1 propos1t1ons.•- If the best legal minds in the country, which the
Supreme Court should certainly represent, cannot tell ahead of time what goes
too far, how will the planning director of weed Patch know?

4/Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260

u.s.

393, 415 (1922)
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Nollan complicates current regulatory approaches that help assure that the
public can get to and along the state's shorelines but the case leaves the
regulatory door ajar enough so that with increased agency staff and very
careful attention to the project's impacts on access we may be able to meet
the tighter •nexus• requirement in most cases involving new shoreline
development.

But the decision puts the so-called •rationally based and in the

general public interest test• in a cocked hat.
Our Commission was granted land use authority under state law to prevent
the unnecessary filling of San Francisco Bay and to increase public access to
the Bay's shoreline.

To accomplish these goals, a Commission permit is needed

to place fill or otherwise develop the Bay or the near shoreline.

Using this

regulatory authority, I believe the Commission has been quite effective in
achieving the Legislature's goals over the past two decades.
about 2,300 acres of the Bay were being filled each year.

Before 1965

Now only about 15

acres are filled annually--all for critical water-oriented needs.
this

~mall

And even

loss of water area is being mitigated by opening diked areas so

that each year the Bay has been getting a bit larger.
When the Bay Commission was established in 1965, less than four miles of
the

shoreline were open to public access.

Today over one hundred miles of

the shore are open and improved with pathways, landscaping and other public
facilities.

Much of this access is provided in the many beautiful shoreline

parks that have been developed by the visionary park agencies that we are
fortunate to have in the Bay Area.

But large amounts of public access has

been made available in public and private shoreline developments through the
Commission's regulatory program.
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To meet its legislative

mandat~/ for assuring that •maximum feasible

public access to the shoreline• is provided as a part of shoreline projects,
the Commission typically includes access conditions in its permits.

These

conditions usually require the developer to set aside a prescribed area, often
along the entire shoreline of the project, for public access.

The developer

is also required to legally restrict this area for public use, improve the
access area with pathways, benches and plants, maintain the access area, and
remain legally responsible for damage or injuries in the public area.

The

approach we use has generally been well accepted by the developers and
property owners in the Bay Area.

It has made San Francisco Bay more

attractive and useful to both the general public and private property owners.
Arguably, it has also added value to many recent developments because the
access encourages the public to go to, shop in and eat at the development.
While I point with pride to the accomplishments of the Commission, I must
caution you that this record was achieved in the 22 years prior to the First
Lutheran and Nollan decisions.

At this point there is some debate and

considerable confusion as to whether the Commission can continue its record of
success in protecting San Francisco Bay's resources and opening public access
to this public treasure.

5/ Section 66602 of the Government Code, in part, states: •The Legislature
further finds and declares that ••• existing public access to the shoreline
and waters of the San Francisco Bay is inadequate and that maximum feasible
public access, consistent with a proposed project, should be provided.•
Section 66632.4, in part, states: •within any portion or portions of the
shoreline band ••• the commission may deny an application for a permit for a
proposed project only on the grounds that the project fails to provide maximum
feasible public access, consistent with the proposed project, to the bay and
its shoreline.•

ts ci izens?
a
s

and, even for a

f government deprives him of all

rary period of time, the Court exempted from

rule what it described as •normal delays in obtaining building
, changes in zoning ordiances, variances, and the like• without
describing what is
ac

in a •normal delay• or what sorts of government

vities generate normal de

as opposed to temporary takings.

The Court

then remanded the case to a lower court to figure out how to apply the new
1 ru e on

rary ta ings to the facts in this case.

For court buffs
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it is interesting to note that Justices Brennan and Marshall joined the
majority while Justice O'Connor dissented in this decision.
In the 5-4 Nollan decision, Justices Brennan and Marshall joined the
dissenters while Justice O'Conner moved to the majority side.

The majority

restated the traditional two-pronged test that a land use regulation,
including a dedication requirement, does not effect a taking if it (1)
advances legitimate state interests and (2) does not deny an owner
economically viable use of his land.

It added the adjective, •substantial• to

the legitimate state interest part of the test and suggested that close
scrutiny will occur whenever physical property is at stake such as with a
dedication requirement.

It never reached the second part of the test because

it found that requiring the Nollan's to provide an easement between the bluff
and the mean high tide line did not substantially advance a legitimate state
interest.

While the court assumes that access along beaches is a legitimate

state interest, it could find no rational connection between the impacts of
the new, larger house and public use of the beach in front of the house.

The

Court states emphatically that there was no connection shown but gives no
guidance as to what type of connection it is interested in seeing.
so the Court has reaffirmed our authority to impose conditions on permits
to achieve legitimate purposes, but found that the Coastal Commission had not

adequately demonstrated that the expansion of a beach cottage generated
impacts justifying a condition requiring the property owners to allow the
public to walk on the beach in front of the cottage.

The Court also

rhetorically suggested a few conditions that it would find acceptable, each
seemingly far more onerous to the property owner than the condition imposed by
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the Coastal Commission.

So we can impose conditions, but not in the way the

Coastal Commission did.

As Justice Stevens said in his dissent, the decision

leaves land use planners •guessing about how the Court will react to the next
case, and the one after that.•
In Keystone Coal the Court considered a Pennsylvania ordinance requiring
mine owners to leave some coal in place so that subsidence wouldn't occur.
The ordinance was not dissimilar from the Pennsylvania Coal case where Justice
Holmes created the whole concept of •inverse condemnation• by his finding that
•the general rule at least is, that while property may be regulated to a
certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a
.

.5/

tak1ng. -

Ironically, the current court found the Pennsylvania ordinance to pass
constitutional muster while Justice Holmes found the 1922 version wanting.
The importance of this recent decision to us today is that it clearly
reaffirms the Court's traditional approach for determining how far a
regulation can go before it constitutes a •taking.•

It will continue to look

at the character of the governmental action -- the •legitimate state
interest".

But it will look harder when land dedications are at stake.

The

Court will also look to the economic impact of the questioned regulation on
the claimant.

Generally, it has been fairly hard for claimants to satisfy the

5/ Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260

u.s.

393 (1922) p. 415
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court about either issue.

so while the risk to government and tbe general

taxpayer is greater, particularly to Californians who have enjoyed judges much
less willing to jeopardize the treasuries of our cities when the complicated
matter of land use is involved and mistakes are made, we are in no different
place concerning what constitutes at taking after First Lutheran and Nollan
than we were before.

Unfortunately that has been and continues to be a very

uncertain and undefined place.

Until the Supreme Court provides further

guidance through future decisions on land use regulation cases, we can only
speculate on the long-term impact of the First Lutheran and Nollan decisions.
For the immediate, I believe the decisions will have four major impacts on
government regulation of development.
First, the cases will generate considerably more litigation challenging
government land use permits.
of reasons.

This litigation will be generated for a variety

Just as we in government are left with uncertainty about the

limits of our authority to regulate land use, the private sector is left with
equal uncertainty.

To provide the Supreme Court with the opportunity to

further clarify its views, I am certain there will be challenges to most every
type of condition over the next few

years~

Furthermore, since the Court has

opened the door to monetary payments for temporary takings, I suspect that
some attorneys are now going to be willing to take inverse condemnation cases
on a speculative fee basis much like they handle liability cases.

If my

suspicions are correct, this will encourage legal challenges that would not
otherwise be financially prudent for private property owners.

For all of

these reasons, one of the main impacts of the First Lutheran and Nollan
decisions will be that a lot more private and public money will be spent on
lawyers fees over the next several years.
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The third major impact of the Court's decisions is that it will become far
more expensive for government agencies to carry out their land use regulatory
functions.

In Nollan, the Supreme Court reaffirmed government's authority to

impose a permit condition, but only if the condition will overcome an impact
that is serious enough to justify denying the per•it.

The Court also

admonished us to make sure the specific condition relates directly to the
specific impact.
In land use regulation, we often deal with complex projects that have many
types of adverse impacts.

A project may generate traffic, be partially within

an environmentally sensitive area, attract workers whose children will
overcrowd schools and cause a host of other problems.

In the past, based on

our experience and observations, we accepted that development in general
brought with it a variety of problems in general.

Unfortunately, we can no

longer rely on empirical data in our regulation of development because the
court has now required that we document the cause and effect of these problems
with analytical data, planning studies and other such information.

Moreover,

we must document each of the multiplicity of problems, demonstrate that the
problem alone is serious enough to justify denying a project permit, and
establish how a condition will directly address that particular problem.

It

will take enormous amounts of money to pay for all of the planning studies,
legal support and permit analysis that will be needed to provide the record
necessary to support permit conditions.
It will also be necessary for government to better coordinate its capital
spending with its planning and land use regulatory programs.

In Nollan, the

Court acknowledged that the Coastal Commission's plan for providing public

- 166 -

access along the beach was acceptable, but that the access easement should be
gained through acquisition rather than through a permit condition.
to purchase public rights to reach public

tidelands~

If we have

it is essential that the

acquisition programs administered by the California Department of Parks and
Recreation, the State Coastal Conservancy, local park districts and other
public agencies be in full conformance with the planning goals of our
Commission, the Coastal Commission, local governments and other planning and
land use regulatory agencies.

Achieving this coordination will take time,

cost money, and may require additional Legislative direction.

But this

focused effort is needed if government is expected to address the impacts of
private development that have in the past been handled through permit
conditions.
Finally, although these decisions have been hailed by developers and
private property owners, I believe that the decisions will cause as many
problems for the private sector as they will for public agencies.

The

litigation that will be stimulated by these decisions will be initiated and
paid fo

by private interests.

The salaries of the public attorneys and

p anners who will be needed to defend the lawsuits and prepare analytical data
to justi

permit conditions will be paid with taxpayer dollars.

Formulating

conditions and documenting the need for the conditions will take time and
de

the issuance of permits.

And most importantly, the decisions will

generate additional tension and frustration between development proponents and
the general public.
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Throughout California we are seeing ever greater numbers of of citizen
initiatives being passed to stop or slow growth.

Despite planners' best

efforts to deal with the complex problems brought about by growth, the general
public has become increasingly dissatisfied with the planners' solutions.

Up

until recently, land use regulators had considerable flexibility to deal with
these complex problems.

The adverse environmental impacts of a project could

be weighed against the benefits provided by a van pool program sponsored by
the project developer.

It appears that in the Nollan decision the Supreme

Court has deprived government of considerable flexibility to come up with
creative, economical and politically acceptable solutions to complex
problems.
isolation.

Each impact of each project will have to be addressed in
If government chooses to impose the sort of onerous conditions the

Court suggested would have been appropriate for the Nollan house permit, the
applicant will be dissatisfied.

If government chooses to conclude that the

problem, by itself, does not justify imposing a condition, the general public
will become further dissatisfied as the cumulative impacts of development
problems become apparent.

Instead of formulating effective solutions,

government will have to choose between ignoring problems and imposing
unacceptable and possibly unworkable conditions.

The inevitable result of

this situation will be even more popular dissatisfaction with government
efforts to responsibly manage growth and more citizens efforts to stop growth
entirely.
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land use, the Nollan and First English decisions explicitly recognize
government's authority to regulate the use of land, even to the extent of
denial of the use of a substantial part of an individual's property.

The Supreme Court, in Nollan, invalidated a Coastal Commission permit
decision which required the dedication, as a condition of permit issuance, of
a strip of land for lateral access along the beach.

The Court clarified the

level of justification that government must provide when it requires the
dedication for public use of part of an owner's interest in property as a
condi
appli

on of development.

It held that the standard of review that will be

to determine whether such regulation will pass constitutional muster

is whether it substantially advances a legitimate state interest.

The Court

indicated that to meet the nsubstantial advancement 11 test, an agency must show
that the development which it seeks to regulate would cause (either
individually or cumulatively) the impact which the condition is designed to
alleviate. and, conversely, that the condition directly responds to that
impact of the development.

That standard may be contrasted with the "rational

basis" test that has previously been applied by the courts in reviewing
regulatory actions of the Commission and other governmental agencies.
Agencies were previously required only to demonstrate a rational relationship
between the project's impacts and the condition imposed.

In effect, the Court

held that the Commission was improperly mixing apples and oranges by allowing
a negotiative type of trade-off between impacts and unrelated conditions.

The
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new test. whi e changing

standard of review of decisions in

California, will not generally require a drastic change in governmental land
use planning and regulatory practices.

Similarly, First English makes a real change in the law to be applied in
California, but one which is limited in scope.
remedies case.
permitted to

11

Properly viewed, it is a

Prior to this decision, California agencies were, in effect,
Cure" regulatory decisions subsequently found to be improper

takings. because the courts required only that regulatory action later
determined to be invalid be repealed or revised.

The Court has now said that

financial compensation is required even when the taking is not permanent.
Thus. the holding
canst
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use regul
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the
occu

law.

on is s

is decision, contra
to be appli
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ing.

press reports following upon it, is

rmining whether a taking has in fact
very real, is not very broad.

Unless one is willing to. as one expert put it.
the limit of these two decisions.

Left entirely unaffected

11

read tea leaves", this is

Although some might find language in these

decisions which hints at future change, the actual holding of a Court decision
is determined by examining the standards prescribed in relation to the facts
recited in that decision.

Lawyers and legal philosophers may spend many hours

Senate Committee on
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debating, for example, esoteric applications of the standard of judicial
review under the "substantial advancement" versus the "rational basis" test.
The widespread speculation as to how the Court in future cases might answer
those questions here left unanswered is exactly

t~at.

As this debate continues the Coastal Commission will face the practical
challenge of implementing the directives of the Nollan decision.

Consistent

with my reading of the Court's ruling in Nollan. I will advise the Commission
that its permit decisions will be closely scrutinized.

The decision

re-emphasizes what government agencies have known since the Topanga decision:
that agency findings must explain the agency's action.

Findings must detail

the agency's analytical process and explain why the agency reached the
conclusion to which it came.

Nollan reminds us that the Commission must

detail in its findings the impacts of a particular project and explain how
those impacts caused by the project can be mitigated by the specific
conditions imposed.

If the Commission finds that a project's impact is not

consistent with Coastal Act policies, and yet cannot devise conditions which
t gate that impact, or explain exactly how these effects can be mitigated by
conditions. it may be compelled by Nollan to deny permits which it has been
its past practice to approve.
Court in the Nollan decision.

This result is clearly contemplated by the
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The Commission has implemented that access mandate in a manner which it
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as well as the Coastal Act.
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REGULATION OF LAND USE
AFTER THE RECENT
SUPREME COURT CASES
• First English Evangelical Lutheran Church
v. County of Los Angeles
• Nollan v. California Coastal Commission

E§T ONS

EllS

-----

In June, the United States Supreme Court issued two major decisions concerning the regulation of land use by local governments:
• In First English, the Court said property owners are entitled to
some compensation if their property has been "taken" by government regulation.
• In Nollan, the Court determined that a particular regulation
requiring dedication of public access was in fact a taking because
there was no relationship between the dedication and the project.

DECISIONS
REVOLUTION

When first issued, these decisions were hailed by some as heralding a revolution in city and county land use planning and regulation. The two cases were seen
by those observers as the most significant court decisions on private property
rights since the early pan of the century.
As land use decisionmakers, planners, and public attorneys have studied the
opinions, however, a different view has emerged: neither Supreme Court decision
alters government's fundamental power to regulate land use, and neither changes
the basic rules defining when a land use regulation "goes too far" and violates the
United States Constitution.
continued on nu:t page
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l
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Q&A is published by People for Open Space/Greenbelt Congress (POS/GC), a 30
year old non-profit citizen organization concerned with the regional planning and open
space needs of the nine county San Francisco Bay Area. The organization is working
for a pennanent metropolitan Greenbelt and for policies to encourage appropriate
development.
This report was authored by Marc Mihaly and Clement Shute of the law finn of
Shute, Mihaly and Weinberger, and by Larry Orman POS/GC Executive Director. The
following persons served as advisors in reviewing the report, and their assistance is
continued on back page

People for Open Space/Greenbelt Congress • 512 Second Street • San Francisco CA 94107

- 174 and is therefore of great importance to public
ments can
decisionmakers and to professionals in the field of land use
planning.
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is
l/, a six-to-three vote of the Court decided
have been
over for several
Court said that now, when a regulation
that it crosses the constitutional line and
becomes a
the landowner has a
to cornpt!ns.aticm
for damages to the property
the time the
regulation was in effect Previously, the solution was to direct
a local government to adopt a new regulation.

State, federal and local governments have the power
through the exercise of "eminent domain" to take privately
owned property for the use or benefit of the public. When the
government exercises this power, it is constitutionally required
to pay the property owner "just compensation" for the property
taken.3/ For example, when government wants to acquire land
for parks or
it must initiate condemnation proceedings to obtain title to the property in return for payment of the
fair market value.

Contrary to
press reports about the case, the Court
did not redefine where that constitutional line is; the Court did
not hold that temporary ordinances or moratoria constitute a
and, the Court did not hold that landowners must be
allowed to develop their land for its most profitable use. The
decision leaves intact the traditional rule -regulations
that deny a
owner all economic use and fail to
advance clear public objectives will be overturned.

In contrast to a direct condemnation, an "inverse condemnation" may result when the government appropriates an interest in
private property, or destroys or physically damages private
property, without formally condemning the property and paying
the property owner. Such governmental action is referred to as a
"taking" of the property without just compensation. The
property owner is entitled to damages in the amount of the fair
market value of the property taken.

Nollan:
Must be

Development and the Dedication

In Nollo.n
the Supreme Court tested the California
Coastal Commission's requirement that a beachfront property
owner allow the
to use a portion of the beach for public
access a<> a condition for
his house. On a close fiveto- four vote, the Court reaffirmed a
limit on
cities and counties which
that conditions
on any development be
to alleviate the
created
that
The
Court struck down the Coastal
Commission's dedication
because the Court could
not find any connection between the
and the
to the
created by the Nollans' house. In doing
the Court restated
broad
land for a
purposes -- even
when such
reduce the value
property.

These two recent Supreme Court decisions both deal with
" Governmental power to
the
and welfare (usually
and
often
and courts are called
upon to
who wins. When courts side with the
property owner,
find that a
has occurred. While such decisions are very rare, the
concept
taking
the limits
govern-

Neither decision alters government's fundamental
power to regulate land use, and neither changes the
basic rules defining when a regulation goes "too far"
Sometimes the taking is a physical invasion of property due
to governmental action, such as inadvertent flooding from a
nearby dam.
a regulatory taking occurs if government oversteps its power to zone or plan.
Generally, government enacts such regulations to protect the
public health, safety, and welfare. Land use controls and zoning
ordinances which further these broad "police power" goals are
presumed to be valid. Even land use regulations which drastically limit the activities that a private property owner can
conduct on property, and substantially reduce the market value
of the property, are usually not seen to be takings.4/
For
family zoning may make a
of
land worth less than a quarter of what it would be worth if an
apartment or a shopping center were allowed. Yet the single
family zone does not constitute a taking. In fact, courts have
upheld the
of
ordinances that reduce the value of
private property by as much as 90 percentS/
Nonetheless, if a regulation "goes too far," it may become a
regulatory taking.6/ The courts decide if a regulation amounts to
a such taking on a case-by-case basis by looking at the following
tests:
A taking has occurred if a regulation does not substanadvance legitimate public interests and deprives
a property owner of substantially all of the market
value or use of his land. 7/ In this test, courts give wide

- 175 discretion to cities and counties to make judgments about
what regulations are necessary.

invalidation of the ordinance, but asked only that the Court
award it damages.

A taking occurs if the regulation interferes with ''reasonable investment- backed expectations"- a concept
put forward by the United States Supreme Court but
defined in relatively few cases. In fact, courts have been
better at defming what does not constitute such expectations; for example, a landowner is not justified in expecting that the zoning on property will remain constant, and
is not protected from changes in zoning laws.

The Court held that, when a land use regulation is a
taking in violation of the constitution, the property owner is
entitled to damages occurring from the time the unconstitutional ordinance is applied to his property until it is withdrawn
by the public agency which enacted it 10/ If the agency
chooses to keep the ordinance in effect, it has the option to use
its power of eminent domain, pay the owner fair market value
and acquire the property.

A taking may occur when the regulation results in a
permanent physical occupation of private property.8/ A
physical occupation of property will, nonetheless, not be
a taking if the physical occupation is a legitimate condition to a development permit - such as a requirement
that a certain portion of a housing tract be dedicated to
public park use. This is the test discussed in the Noll an

case.
But despite much discussion in governmental and legal
circles, the fact remains that only in extremely rare situations do
courts find that zoning ordinances or other planning regulations
actually step over the constitutional line and create a taking of
private property.

FIRST ENGLISH :
What a Lando\\11er Gets When a "Regulatory
Taking" Has Occurred -The Rule Changes
What happens if a court determines that a state law or local
ordinance fails these tests and that a regulatory taking of private
property has occurred? Is the offensive ordinance simply invalidated, or must the government in addition pay damages to the
property owner?
At least in California prior to First English, the only remedy
available to a landowner for a regulatory taking was the invalidation of the unconstitutional regulation. Local government was
not required to pay monetary compensation to the property
owner.9/ In reaching this conclusion, the California Supreme
Court weighed the benefits of compensating property owners
against the chilling effect that rule could have on enactment of
necessary measures to protect the public health, safety and
welfare.
In First English, the Supreme Court changed this "no
damages" rule. The First English case involved church property
in a canyon that was subject to flooding. After a severe flood
killed several persons and destroyed the buildings on the
property, the County of Los Angeles enacted an interim ordinance creating a flood protection area and prohibiting rebuilding
any structures there. The church sued the county, alleging that
the regulation was a taking of its property. It did not request

What the First English Case Did Not Say
The Court did not add any new law to the question of
whether an ordinance constitutes a taking. The lower courts
and the Supreme Court did not decide whether the flood
protection ordinance destroyed the use or value of the property
and did not decide whether it was a valid safety measure. The
California courts, and therefore the Supreme Court, were
concerned solely with the question of whether money damages would be available to the property owner if it were
ultimately determined in a trial that a taking had occurred. Ill
Ironically, it is unlikely that the Los Angeles ordinance is a
taking under established law which is especially deferential to
city and county ordinances enacted to protect life and safety.
A second misunderstanding 'about First English relates to
the Court's use of the word "temporary." Some have taken the
Court's opinion to mean that moratoria or interim ordinances
constitute regulatory takings just because they are temporary
prohibitions. While it so happened that the Los Angeles ordinance challenged in this case was a temporary ordinance, the
Court's opinion would apply to any ordinance that violated the
Constitution. In fact, temporary ordinances are not likely to
violate the Constitution because they usually have a small
effect on market value.
IN SUM: If --and only if-- a taking by regulation can
be proven, a landowner can now claim compensation/or any
value lost during the time the regulation affected his or her
property.

NOLI.AN:
The Supreme Court Decides That One Required
Dedication Flunks the Constitutional Test
In Nollan, the Supreme Court looked at the constitutionality of one type of governmental regulation, namely, dedications of real property attached as conditions to development
permits designed to lessen the adverse impacts of develop-

3
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view
take care of the increased
need for

diminish the
open to the

view of the beach and
coastline which

To offset these
the Commission
Nollans to
an easement to the public, consisting of a
of their oceanfront in between two adjoining
narrow
beaches. The Nollans
that the
condition was a

a five- to- four vote, the United States

Court
condition constituted a permanent
rights which would
invasion of the Nollans'
unless the condition "substantially advanced" a
governmental interest." The Court
concluded that the de.dication didn 'l pass this test.
found that the

the
The Court stated that the Commission
could
dedication of a viewing area on the
Nollans' property as a condition of permit approval since such a
area would substantially advance a legitimate governmental interest in
the view of the beach and ocean
which
be wholly or partially blocked by the Nollans'
home.

It is unclear whether the Nollan test applies to any conditions other than dedications of real property. The reasoning of
the Court appears limited to
appropriations of real
property which eliminate the owner's right to exclude others.
The opinion may not apply to requirements for in lieu fees or
other exactions, such as payment for or construction of capital
The test for such monetary exactions may
remain as before Nollan. The remedy in the event such
monetary exactions are judged irrational appears to remain
invalidation.

IN SUM: Exactions on development must address a
problem created or contributed to by the development, or the
cumulative effects of development. The dedication in Nollan
failed the test because the Court could find no connection
between the problem -- a large house blocking the public's
views to the beach from the inland -- and the condition-- allowing the public already on the beach to walk in front of the
lwuse.

Questions and Answers About

ordinance that made someone 's property into
park -- that that required the property owner to
a
admit the public, without charge, to his or her property for recreational use.l4/

barriers to beach access, or
beaches so
the denial
11"'',.,''"" the owner of all eccmomi(::3ll
Court even Pnr!rW<CPti
do address the burden created

Q. If a town enacts an emergency interim ordinance
certain uses of property, to protect against
an immediate threat to the public health and safety,
such as flood danger or other hazards, is that a taking
of
property?
A. No. As discussed above, the interim nature of an
ordinance does not lead to the conclusion that a taking has
occurred. More irnJX)rtant, actions taken to protect the public
health and safety -- rather than the public "welfare" concerns

- 177 (such a<> density of housing) -- may be much more harsh if necessary to protect life and property. A ftre department, for
example, may in an emergency destroy a house to prevent the
spread of the frre without paying for it. This stems from the
legal concept that one may not use one's property in a manner
that poses danger to life or property. IS/

Q. If a local government enacts a temporary moratorium ordinance prohibiting the issuance of building
permits to maintain the status quo for a reasonable
period (for example, two years) and to enable the city
or county to proceed with planning to address concerns about the impacts of increased development, is
that a taking of private property rights?
A. No. First English did not single out temporary
moratoria for special treatment. The usual takings tests apply,
and it is unlikely that a temporary moratorium undertaken for
planning purposes would meet the requirements for a taking.l6/
Although a moratorium could temporarily depress property
prices, such fluctuations usually fall far short of destroying
"substantially all" the market value of property and are constitutionally permissible.

Q. If a local government enacts a slow-growth
ordinance limiting the number of building permits to
be issued per year, is that a taking of private property
righl<;?
A. NOl unless the "slow growth" ordinance is so restrictive as to constitute essentially "no growth." If an ordinance
were so restrictive that a landowner could demonstrate that the
period for development was so long that the property
had been deprived of substantially all its value, a taking could
be established. Even if residential or commercial development
but the property could be used for
were permanenlly
a beneficial use such as agriculture, a taking would not have
occurred.

could constitute a taking.

Q. If the voters of a community pass an initiative
measure to temporarily halt development in their
area, is that a taking?

A. The fact that an ordinance is passed by initiative does
not change the applicable constitutional standard. As discussed
above, a temporary halt on development is unlikely to ever be a
taking because it usually has only a small effect on market
values.
Q. Is a down-zoning of land -such as from rural
residential to exclusive agricultural, or from intensive
residential to less intensive residential, or from commercial to residential uses - a taking?

A. Changing the zoning designation of a parcel does not
become a taking simply because the designation is for a less
intensive use. In order to constitute a taking, the new zone
would have to be so restrictive as to violate one of the tests
discussed above, including depriving the land of substantially
all its value 17/.

What Are the Implications ofFirst English?
· Q. Does First English increase the likelihood that a
land use regulation would be found to be a taking?

A. No. The case does not discuss the criteria for how to
analyze whether a taking has occurred. It does not change the
test for the validity of a regulation. In particular, California
law holding that temporary interim regulations and downzonings are not takings is unaffected by the decision.

Q. Does First English mean that a local government
local government enacts an ordinance halting
development until a certain service level (such as sewer
capacity, schoolroom capacity, street improvements) is
is that a taking?
A. Such ordinances should be carefully drafted and
enacted only after thorough study. As long as there is a
that development will be permitted in the short-term
and that the designated level of service goals are reasonable, the ordinance will survive a takings attack. A connection
must also exist between the halted development and the stated
community problem (e.g., traffic). In constrasl, a development
moratorium of indefinite duration attached to goals for community service levels that are obviously unlikely to be attained

must zone real property to allow the use potentially
most profitable to the owner?
A. No. The test for a regulatory taking is still whether
the governmental action deprives the owner of substantially all
reasonable use of the property, or substantially all economic
value. Unless there is a physical invasion, any regulation that
leaves the owner some reasonable use or economic value will
be upheld. The First English decision does not address this
traditional test or change it in any way.

continued
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such as the
of in lieu fees or the provisions of
fadlities?18/

owner can
prove in court that the
him or her of
all rea<>onable use of the
In practice, it is
that there will be some ca..es.
statutes of limiuu,:,.:u•<.:> to bring their claims to court
within a certain
of time after they learn
have a
may limit the amount of
over
regulations. The more
issue lies in the
as landowners consider whether to
new
or
conditions.
.,...,~""'·•·h,

'-'<"''"""""" might be calculated according to

For
interim
in condemnation
often
focus on the rental value of the
interest taken for the
of time in which it was
The
application of these
to
will have to
over time and may involve
proceto be used to determine any damage awards.

A. Nollan may not apply to exactions other than those
dedications of real property. If Nollan were to apply,
an in lieu fee would be constitutional as long as it relates to a
problem caused by the development and is in reasonable proportion to the
of the development In California, it is always
advisable that fees which address community-wide problems be
supported by documentation which connects the development
project to those problems.l9/

Q. Did Nollan change the law of takings?
A. Not significantly. As a result of First English , government must compensate a landowner for a regulation or exaction
which "goes too far" for any damages to the property for the
period of time that the regulation affected the property. Nollan
applied the takings rule in a specific instance involving the
dedication of real property. Under Nollan, when there is no
clear connection between the public burdens imposed by a
particular land use approval and the required dedication of real
property, there may be a taking. Under First English, cities and
counties would then be required to compensate the landowner
for the damage to the property for the period of time that the
dedication was actually in effect

wm the following types of dedications be valid
after Nollan?

Q.

...Roads in a subdivision?

A. Yes. Land dedications for such uses as roads, sideand schools should easily satisfy the requirement that
address a burden created or contributed to by the development
""''""·Mnmf'nl

to

••• Public

Yes. Park dedications inside a subdivision should
pass the
Dedication of park lands
or at some other location would be supportable as
as they are reasonably in proportion to the needs generated
the effects of the
In lieu fee contributions are
discussed in a question above.
easements?
A. Yes. The Nollan court specifically mentioned the posof conditioning development approvals on the creation
of a public viewing area on private property in order to protect
the
view. The court indicated that such a requirement
would be valid even
it involved a conveyance of an
-- if it offset the obstruction of the view
the development.

- 179 ... Open space easements which prevent development on
portions of private property?
A. Yes. Dedications for either passive or active open
space uses would survive the Nollan test as long as they meet
open space needs created individually or cumulatively by the
development To the extent development would damage or
destroy open space resources such as creeks, unique vegetation
or wildlife habitat, dedications should be upheld if the owner is
allowed a reasonable use elsewhere on the property or is able to
transfer development rights. Likewise, where dedications are
required to allow development on hazardous areas such as
unstable slopes, areas prone to slide or earthquake faults, they
should be sustained if the owner is otherwise allowed a reasonable use.

NOTES
1. First English Evangelical Lwheran Church v. County of Los
Angeles 107 S .Ct. 2378 (1987).
2. Nollan v. Coastal Commission 55 U.S.L.W. 5145 (June 26, 1987).
3. United States Constitution, 5th Amendment. California Constitution,
Article I. 19.

4. See, e.g., Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); HFH, Lld.
v, Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508 (1975).
5. William C. Haas Co. v. City ofSan Francisco, 605 F.2d 1117,1120-l 121
(9th Cir. 1979), cert. den. 445 U.S. 928 (1979).
6. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,413-14 (1922).
7. Agins v. Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d266 (1979), aff'dAginsv. Tiburon,447 U.S.
255 (1980).
8. See Penn CenJralTransportation Co. v. City ofNew York, 438 U.S.l04
(1978); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhallan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419
(1982).
9. Agins v. City ofTiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266 (1979). See Agins v. City of
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).

Q. Does Nollan affect the validity of assessment
districts created for funding improvements such as
nood control, drainage, or roads?
A. No. Again, No/ian may apply only to dedications of
interests in real property. Even if Nol/an were to apply to
assessments or other fees in connection with districts, there is
usually a very close connection required between the burdens
imposed by the new development and the creation of an assessment district to pay for necessary improvements.

sion that they had no right to use the strip of beach and tidelands seaward
of the private property line. Increasing the size of the house could also
create congestion on the public beaches. In addition, the Commission
found that increased private use of the beach might fuel disputes between
the public and the private owners over the boundary line. However, the
Court's opinion does not focus on these fmdings.

13. Specifically, the Nollans argued that the dedication required them to
give up the right to exclude others from the property, and that the
condition could not be justified since the new home would do nothing to
interfere with public access.
14. Zoning for commercial recreation areas is valid, however. Activities
such as amusement parks, golf courses, tennis clubs, etc. may or may not
be open to the public at the discretion of the owner, give land substantial
economic value, and are not a taking. See Freedman v. Fairfax, 81 Cal.
App. 3d 667 (1978).
15. See, e.g., Turner v. County of Del Norte, 24 Cal. App. 3d 311 (1972)
(zoning restrictions that protect people and property from flooding are a
proper exercise of the police power).
16. An interim measure restricting or halting construction pending
further land ~se planning is not a taking. State v. Superior Court, 12 Cal.
3d 237, 254-55 (1974); CEEED v. California Coastal Zone Conservation
Commission, 43 Cal. App. 3d 306,314 (1974).

10. The Court explicitly refrained from "resolv[ing] the takings claim on
the merits." 107 S.Ct. at 2384. It "ha(d] no occasion to decide whether
the ordinance at issue actually denied appellant all use of its property" or
not. Id.

17. See for example, Joyce v. City of Portland 546 P.2d 1100 (Ct. App.
Or. 1976) where 800 acres were downzoned from agricultural to
residential; and Gisler v. County of Madera, 38 Cal. App. 3d 303, 112
Cal. Rptr. 919 (1974), where exclusive agricultural zoning was held not
to be a tak.ing.

11. The Court did not explicitly state when the "taking" would begin.
For example, where a procedure for receiving a permit is provided, a
property owner would have to go through that process and be turned
down before a taking could have occurred. Williamson County Regional
Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172
(1985).

18. For example, a local government may require developers to pay fees
for school facilities as a condition of development of residential subdivision (see Candid Emerprises, Inc. v. Grossmon.J Union High School Dist.,
39 Cal. 3d 878 (1985)) or to pay special assessment for public improvements necessitated by new development (see J.W. Jones Companies v.
Ci.Jy of San Diego, 157 Cal. App. 3d 745 (1984)).

12. The Commission also found that the larger residence would increase
private use of the beach, contributing to the public beach users' impres-

19. Fees wruch fail that test could be held to be a special tax under
Proposition 13 and related law.
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Sacramento, CA 95814
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STATEMENT OF J. LAURENCE MINTIER
MINTIER & ASSOCIATES
ON BEHALF OF
THE CALIFORNIA CHAPTER
OF THE AMERICAN PLANNING ASSOCIATION
"The Limits of Land Use Regulation"
Senate Local Government Committee
August 13, 1987

Madame Chairman and members of the Senate Local Government Committee, I
am Larry Mintier of Mintier & Associates, Planning Consultants.

I am here

representing the California Chapter of the American Planning Association.
My comments principally concern the possible impacts popular perceptions of
the First English and Nollan decisions will have on local planning and land
use regulatory programs.

Based on my reading of the two decisions and numerous commentaries on the
cases, it seems there is more smoke than fire in these two court decisions.
But just as the smoke from a fire is more often fatal than the fire itself, the
popular perception (or misperception) of these two decisions will have a
greater impact on local planning and land use regulation than will the
decisions themselves.

In a strictly legal sense, these two decisions do not appear to change the
basic rules of local land use planning and regulation.

The First English

decision told us only the remedy for a taking; it did not redefine what
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constitutes a

us little more than what we

already knew, or

known--namely, that development conditions

must advance a

public interest and logically relate to the identified

Again, in a strictly legal sense, nothing seems to have changed.

Still, as

before these decisions were handed down, governments can plan, zone (even
down zone) , control growth, abate nuisances, impose conditions on
development approvals, and enact moratoria.

To the extent that local

planning and regulatory practices were in compliance with constitutional,
statutory, and case law prior to these two decisions, no changes should be
necessary as a consequence

decisions.

Had these decisions not been so sensationally reported and misinterpreted by
the press, local governments

have felt less compelled to change the
problem is that the decisions were
were

misreported

the early days

announcement of these two decisions, local
governments all over California began receiving letters and telephone calls
property owners, developers, and attorneys citing First English and
~=;;.:;;

and

local plans and regulations

their projects were not approved or if
their property interests were not
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changed.

As lay people, property owners can be excused for misunderstand-

ing what the Supreme Court said in these two cases.

The attorneys know

better--or at least should.

One of my client cities just completing a comprehensive general plan
revision received a letter in early July in which an attorney representing a
major property interest in the community cited both First English and Nollan
in support of his claim that his client had not received fair treatment and
had experienced major delays in the city's 2-1/2 year-long general plan
revision process.

He concluded that the city's general plan process had

"severely compromised [his] client's development rights" and that "such
extraordinary delays require monetary compensation because they represent a
clear taking of private property".

He went on to say that "[a]s the two

recent U.S. Supreme Court cases regarding land use point out, public
actions, such as scenic ridgeline [policies], can be justified only when the
public pays for the development rights, which are restricted by such
policies."

Incidentally, the subject property is outside the city limits.

Most cities and counties in California have probably received similar letters
in the past two months.

Without a doubt, the popular perception of the First English and Nollan
decisions has had and will continue to have a major impact on local planning
and land use regulation.

Already, one northern California court has
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required a city planning commission to make additional findings based on the
;;;..,...;;;..;;;;;;.;;.;.=

decision supporting development conditions it had imposed on a

project.

The Board of Supervisors of one California county in the final stages of a
comprehensive general plan revision recently authorized a $100,000
supplemental general plan budget allocation for additional legal review of
their draft general plan and for economic analysis of takings claims based on
the First English and Nollan decisions .

Local officials are understandably nervous abqut the possibility that they
may have to pay compensation for takings.

The costs could be enormous

and the impact on the local budgets disastrous.

Local officials are probably

as concerned about the cost of the litigation. itself.
lawsuits are expensive for local governments.

Win or lose,

The City of Santa Cruz spent

a half million dollars defending its 1979 Measure 0 greenbelt initiative
court against a takings claim.

The city won, but at a staggering

cost to the city treasury.

of the lawsuits that will inevitably be filed based on the
First English and Nollan decisions, local officials may be confronted with the
of defending themselves in cases where they may prevail if they
enough money or watering down regulations or making concessions to
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property owners and developers who threaten litigation.

This is a

"lose-lose" proposition for both local governments and the citizens they
represent.

Out of fear of litigation, local governments may respond in several ways:

1.

Local governments will probably spend more time and money having
their attorneys review. land use plans and regulations before adoption to
ensure compliance with constitutional and statutory requirements.

2.

Elected officials, planning commissioners, local planners, and public
agency attorneys will probably spend more time drafting findings and
preparing documentation to support the conditions they impose on
development approvals.

3.

Local officials may not enact useful and needed land use regulations
even where the community wants them and the local government has
solid legal grounds for doing so.

4.

Local governments may make greater concessions to property owners
and developers in the development review and approval process.

In

some of these cases, local governments may assume a larger share of
the responsibility for financing public services and improvements or
simply settle for a lower level of service.

- 186 -

5.

In some areas, local governments may substitute incentive programs for
regulatory measures to secure needed or desirable services and
facilities.

For instance, a local government might grant a density

bonus to residential projects that include child care facilities in lieu of
requiring the developer to construct such facilities or to make an equivalent
financial contribution.

Local governments may also rely more on density

techniques such as clustering and transfer of development rights.

While there are likely to be some positive results of the First English and
Nollan decisions in terms of improving and tightening up the local land use
planning and regulatory process, local governments will waste a tremendous
amount of the agencies' time and the public's money defending themselves in
court and trying to avoid litigation based on these two decisions.

In the First English and Nollan decisions, it is the smoke, not the fire, that
we need to be concerned about.
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